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ABSTRACT
Hsu, Terry C.-H. PhD, Purdue University, May 2018. Memory Subsystems for Security, Consistency, and Scalability. Major Professors: Patrick Eugster and Mathias
Payer.
In response to the continuous demand for the ability to process ever larger datasets,
as well as discoveries in next-generation memory technologies, researchers have been
vigorously studying memory-driven computing architectures that shall allow dataintensive applications to access enormous amounts of pooled non-volatile memory.
As applications continue to interact with increasing amounts of components and
datasets, existing systems struggle to eÿciently enforce the principle of least privilege for security. While non-volatile memory can retain data even after a power loss
and allow for large main memory capacity, programmers have to bear the burdens of
maintaining the consistency of program memory for fault tolerance as well as handling huge datasets with traditional yet expensive memory management interfaces
for scalability. Today’s computer systems have become too sophisticated for existing
memory subsystems to handle many design requirements.
In this dissertation, we introduce three memory subsystems to address challenges
in terms of security, consistency, and scalability. Specifcally, we propose SMVs to
provide threads with fne-grained control over access privileges for a partially shared
address space for security, NVthreads to allow programmers to easily leverage nonvolatile memory with automatic persistence for consistency, and PetaMem to enable
memory-centric applications to freely access memory beyond the traditional process
boundary with support for memory isolation and crash recovery for security, consistency, and scalability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation advances the design and implementation of traditional memory subsystems. Specifcally, the proposed memory subsystems address three important issues in modern software: security, consistency, and scalability.

1.1 Background
This dissertation is mainly about achieving three things using memory subsystems:
security, the techniques for eÿcient memory compartmentalization; consistency, the
techniques for automatic persistence of consistent program states; and scalability, the
techniques for fast access to large amount of memory beyond the traditional process
boundary with support for memory isolation and crash recovery.

1.1.1 Security
Coordinating software components with di˙erent privilege levels is a key requirement for the stability and security of today’s computer systems. However, failing
to properly isolate components in the same address space has resulted in a substantial amount of vulnerabilities. Enforcing the least privilege principle for memory
accesses can selectively isolate software components to restrict attack surface and
prevent unintended cross-component memory corruption. However, the boundaries
and interactions between software components are hard to reason about and existing approaches have failed to stop attackers from exploiting vulnerabilities caused by
poor isolation.
To address the challenges in selective memory isolation, we present the secure
memory views (SMV): a practical and eÿcient and memory system for secure and
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selective memory isolation in monolithic multithreaded applications in Chapter 2.
SMV o˙ers explicit access control of memory and allows concurrent threads within the
same process to partially share or fully isolate their memory space in a controlled and
parallel manner following application requirements. An evaluation of our prototype in
the Linux kernel (TCB < 1,800 LOC) shows negligible runtime performance overhead
in real-world applications including Cherokee web server (< 0.69%), Apache httpd web
server (< 0.93%), and Mozilla Firefox web browser (< 1.89%) with at most 12 LOC
changes.

1.1.2 Consistency
Non-volatile memory technologies, such as memristor [1] and phase-change memory [2], will allow programs to persist data with regular memory instructions. Liberated from the overhead to serialize and deserialize data to storage devices, programs
can aim for high performance and still be crash fault-tolerant. Unfortunately, to
leverage non-volatile memory, existing systems require hardware changes or extensive
program modifcations.
To help programmers to easily leverage non-volatile memory, we introduce
NVthreads, a memory subsystem and runtime that adds persistence to existing multithreaded C/C++ programs in Chapter 3. NVthreads is a drop-in replacement for
the pthread library and requires only tens of lines of program changes to leverage
non-volatile memory. NVthreads infers consistent states via synchronization points,
uses the process memory to bu˙er uncommitted changes, and logs writes to ensure a
program’s data is recoverable even after a crash. NVthreads’ page level mechanisms
result in good performance: applications that use NVthreads can be more than 2×
faster than state-of-the-art systems that favor fne-grained tracking of writes. After a failure, iterative applications that use NVthreads gain speedups by resuming
execution.
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1.1.3 Scalability
Data intensive applications — enabled by emerging non-volatile memory technologies and motivated by modern memory-driven computations — demands scalable
memory management for accessing vast amounts of main memory. A large memory
pool is only useful if applications can eÿciently access and protect data without
expensive context switches. No existing framework currently allows applications to
decouple memory from the process abstraction with privilege separation, thereby limiting the scalability of memory-driven applications in the big data era.
In Chapter 4, we present the design and implementation of PetaMem: a memory subsystem that enables memory-centric applications to freely access memory beyond the traditional process boundary with support for isolation and crash recovery.
PetaMem completely decouples the traditionally fused abstractions of processes and
memory from space and time. The novel kernel-level pager and reference monitor in
PetaMem organize virtual memory in di˙erent address spaces eÿciently and securely.
PetaMem provides a crash recovery engine to make applications running on nonvolatile memory systems fault tolerant. Our evaluation shows that applications using
PetaMem can outperform the traditional process-centric design by two orders of magnitude when accessing memory in multiple address spaces, and the recovery engine
provides three orders of magnitude speedup when recovering from crash failures.

1.2 Problem Statement
No practical memory subsystems currently allow applications to (1) achieve selective intra-process isolation with negligible overheads, (2) guarantee program consistent states automatically with low overheads, or (3) access large amount of memory
beyond the traditional process boundary with memory isolation and crash recovery
support. Current solutions impose signifcant programming burdens and performance
overheads on applications when isolating, persisting, and accessing large amount of
memory.
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1.3 Thesis Statement
The thesis of this dissertation is that we can advance the design and implementation of existing memory subsystems to enhance the security, consistency, and scalability of applications through a software approach. This thesis will introduce memory
subsystems to achieve strong intra-process isolation for security, automatic data persistence for consistency, and fast access to large amount of memory for scalability.

1.4 Contributions
This dissertation makes the following contributions.
First, the design and implementation of our memory subsystem which provides
threads with fne-grained control over privileges for a partially shared address space.
Second, the specifcation of an application programming interface for programmers
that facilitates porting existing legacy software for intra-process isolation.
Third, an evaluation of our memory subsystem prototype showing a practical
and eÿcient memory subsystem to achieve intra-process isolation for multithreaded
applications.
Fourth, the design and implementation of our memory subsystem and runtime
that infers when data structures are consistent and adds durability semantics with
very few program modifcations.
Fifth, an extensive evaluation of our memory subsystem demonstrating the ease
of use for programmers to leverage non-volatile memory in practice.
Sixth, the design and implementation of our memory subsystem that enables applications to eÿciently access large amount of memory without requiring any hardware
modifcations.
Seventh, the specifcation of an application programming interface for programmers to access large amount of memory in memory-centric computing.
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Eighth, an evaluation of our memory subsystem showing the performance improvement over the traditional process-centric architecture when accessing large amount of
memory.
Finally, this dissertation provides details and experience for designing practical
memory subsystems from high-level concepts, design logic, to low-level implementation techniques.

1.5 Organization
This dissertation has fve chapters. Chapter 2 presents our memory subsystem
that enforces strict intra-process isolation for security. Chapter 3 describes our memory subsystem that persists consistent program states in non-volatile memory for
consistency. Chapter 4 illustrates our memory subsystem that eÿciently addresses
large amount of memory for scalability. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation.
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2 MEMORY SUBSYSTEM FOR SECURITY
In this chapter we present a memory subsystem [3] for selective intra-process isolation
along with an extensive evaluation of the system prototype. We propose a corresponding application programming interface with concrete application examples.

2.1 Overview
Ideally, software components are separated logically into small fault compartments, so that a defect in one component cannot compromise the others. This concept of privilege separation [4, 5] protects confdentiality and integrity of data (and
code) that should only be accessible from small trusted components. However, most
applications use a single address space, shared among all components and threads.
Redesigning all legacy multithreaded applications to use processes for isolation is
impractical. Today’s software, such as web servers and browsers, enhances its functionality through libraries, modules, and plugins that are developed independently
by various third-parties. Failing to properly separate privileges in applications and
confne software components in terms of their memory spaces leaves a system vulnerable to attacks such as privilege escalation, denial-of-service, bu˙er overfows, and
control-fow hijacking, jeopardizing both the stability and the security of the system.
This chapter develops and evaluates a new memory subsystem known as secure
memory views (SMVs) to enable strict thread isolation for C/C++ multithreaded
applications. SMV is a programming abstraction to support selective memory isolation with kernel-level implementation. The extensive evaluation suggests that SMV
is robust and practical for large-scale production software.
Many proposals exist for privilege separation in a monolithic application. The frst
generation privilege separation techniques focus on splitting a process into di˙erent
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single-process compartments. Provos et al. [6] presented an intra-process privilege
separation case study by manually partitioning OpenSSH components into privileged
master processes and unprivileged slave processes. Privtrans [7] automated the partitioning procedure. Wedge [8] then introduced capabilities to privilege separation
and Salus [9] enabled a dynamic security policy. Unfortunately, all these techniques
cannot support multithreaded compartments.
Second generation privilege separation techniques like Arbiter [10] aimed to support multithreaded applications by allowing concurrent thread execution. However,
Arbiter’s implementation for separating memory space and its serialized user-level
memory management impose prohibitive runtime overhead (200% – 400% for memory operations). As a result, the thread execution is not fully concurrent since all
threads must wait on a global barrier to tag memory pages for capabilities. In addition, the required retroftting e˙orts for legacy software are non-trivial, as the case
studies showed that at least hundreds of lines of code (LOC) changes are required to
separate software components even for applications that have small code base sizes
(8K LOC).
We postulate that a third generation privilege separation technique for achieving
intra-process isolation in monolithic multithreaded applications such as the Cherokee
web server, Apache httpd, and the Mozilla Firefox web browser, needs to fulfll the
following requirements (which are only partially addressed by existing solutions) for
wide adoption:
- Genericity and fexibility (GF): Implementing privilege separation in di˙erent types
of applications requires programmers to employ completely di˙erent abstractions
and concepts. A general model with a universal interface and isolation concept
that supports both client- and server-side multithreaded applications is needed (e.g.,
compartments in the Firefox browser, worker bu˙ers in Cherokee web server, worker
pools in Apache httpd web server).
- Ease of use (EU): Programmers prefer to realize their desired security policy in
a model with a high-level API rather than through low-level error-prone memory
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management tools without intra-process capabilities (e.g., mmap, shmem.). In
particular, porting legacy software to a new model has to be easy despite the
complexity of component interweaving and the underlying assumption of shared
memory (e.g., Firefox, which contains 13M LOC), and should be possible with
minimal code refactoring e˙orts.
- No hardware modifcations (NH): Over-privileged multithreaded applications are
pervasive. A model that is ready to run on today’s commodity hardware (even
regardless of the CPU brands/models) is necessary for wide deployment.
- Low runtime overhead (LO): Monitoring application memory accesses at high frequency is unrealistic for practical systems. A practical model must be implemented
in a way that incurs only negligible runtime overheads. In particular, enhanced security should not sacrifce the parallelism in multithreaded applications. A model has
to support selective memory isolation for multiple computing entities (i.e., multiple
threads can exercise the same privilege to parallelize a given workload and perform
highly parallel memory operations).
To address the above challenges, we propose a third generation privilege separation
solution for monolithic applications: secure memory views – a model and architecture
that eÿciently enforces di˙erential security and fault isolation policies in monolithic
multithreaded applications at negligible overheads. SMV protects applications from
negligent or malicious memory accesses between software components. In short, the
intrinsically shared process address space is divided into a dynamic set of memory
protection domains. A thread container SMV maintains a collection of memory protection domains that defne the memory view for its associated threads. Access privileges to the memory protection domains are explicitly defned in the SMVs and the
associated SMVthreads must strictly follow the defned security policies. The SMV
model provides a well-defned interface for programmers to exercise the least privilege
principle for arbitrary software objects “inside” a multithreaded process. For example,
a server’s worker thread can be confgured to allow access to its thread stack and part

9
of the global server confguration but not to the private key that resides within the
same process address space.
With the SMV model, the programmer can enforce di˙erent access permissions for
di˙erent components in a single address space (GF). New software can leverage the
full API and can be designed to only share data along a well-defned API, and existing
software can be retroftted (with minimal code changes) by instrumenting calls across
component boundaries to change the underlying memory view (EU). Moreover, the
privilege enforcement relies on OS kernel level page table manipulation and standard
hardware virtual memory protection mechanisms (NH). Therefore, the SMV model
does not su˙er from the performance overheads (LO) imposed by IPC (vs in-memory
communication), user level memory management (vs kernel level), or per-instruction
reference monitors (vs hardware trap). The SMV model’s programmability and eÿcient privilege enforcement mechanism allow it to protect both client- and server-side
multithreaded applications with low overhead.
We implemented a prototype of the SMV model in the Linux kernel. Our evaluation demonstrates (a) its negligible runtime overhead in the presence of high concurrency using multithreaded benchmarks that employ the general producer-consumer
pattern, and (b) the immediate beneft of eÿcient software component isolation by
compartmentalizing client connections for the popular Cherokee and Apache httpd
web servers and the compartments in the Firefox web browser. SMVs incur only
around 2% runtime overhead overall with 2 LOC changes for the multithreaded benchmark PARSEC, 0.69% throughput overhead with 2 LOC changes for Cherokee, 0.93%
throughput overhead with 2 LOC changes for Apache httpd, and 1.89% runtime overhead with only 12 LOC changes for the Firefox web browser. Note that SMV focuses
on restricting memory views for individual threads, access permissions for kernel APIs
is an orthogonal problem that is well covered by, e.g., AppArmor [11], SELinux [12],
or the seccomp framework [13].
In summary, this chapter makes the following contributions:
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Table 2.1.: Issues and solutions for intra-process privilege separation techniques.
1st gen technique
Problem

Non-parallel privilege separation

2nd gen technique

3rd gen technique

Concurrent execution

Concurrent memory

and dynamic

operations and

security policy

high performance

tackled
Issue
vs

OpenSSH [6]

Privtrans [7]

Wedge [8]

Salus [9]

Arbiter [10]

SMV (This work)

Process

Process

Single thread

Single thread

Multiple threads

Multiple threads

Not handled

Not handled

Not handled

Not handled

Partially handled

Yes

Not handled

Not handled

Not handled

Not handled

Not handled

Yes

Static

Static

Static

Dynamic

Dynamic

Dynamic

OS

Compiler, OS

OS

Library, OS

Library, OS

OS (< 1800 LOC)

Fully manual

Annotations

Tool assisted

Tool assisted

Fully manual

Library assisted

(> 100 Δ LOC)

(< 20 Δ LOC)

FUSE (8K LOC) etc.

Firefox (13M LOC) etc.

solution
Security
principal
Parallel
execution
Parallel
tagging
Security
policy
TCB
Refactoring
e˙orts
Use

OpenSSH

OpenSSH etc.

OpenSSH etc.

PolarSSL

cases

Design of the SMV model which provides threads with fne-grained control over privileges for a shared address space.
Specifcation of an SMV API for programmers that facilitates porting legacy pthread
applications.
Implementation of the SMV model that consists of a trusted Linux kernel component
(implementing enforcement) and the corresponding untrusted user-space library
that implement the SMV API, which is publicly available along with our benchmarks and test suite1 .
1

https://github.com/terry-hsu/smv
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Evaluation of our prototype implementation showing that SMVs achieve all four desired requirements as a practical and eÿcient model for enforcing least privilege
memory views for multithreaded applications in practice.

2.2 Related Work
Techniques for achieving intra-process isolation have been studied for decades. In
this section, we summarize and compare the related work following a more detailed
breakdown.
Memory safety is the goal of many proposals, as memory corruption is the
root cause of various well-known software vulnerabilities. We refer the reader to
Nagarakatte et al. [14] and Szekeres et al. [15] for two surveys on memory safety.
In short, solutions for complete memory safety do not handle intra-process privilege
separation problem and impose signifcant cost for practical systems (cf. LO).
The frst generation privilege separation techniques focus on partitioning
a process into single-process components. Provos et al. [6] were the frst to manually partition OpenSSH by running components in di˙erent processes and coordinating them through inter-process communication (IPC). Privtrans [7] automated the
retroftting procedure for legacy software by partitioning one program into a privileged
monitor process and an unprivileged slave process with just few programmer-added
annotations. Wedge [8] extended the idea of privilege separation to provide fnegrained privilege separation with static capabilities, which was improved by Dune [16]
through the Intel VT-x technology (cf. NH) for better performance and by Salus [9]
for dynamic security policy. The disadvantage of these frst generation techniques is
that they lack support for multiple computing entities within the same compartment
(cf. LO). This limitation hurts performance of multithreaded programs and restricts
the usability of these solutions in practice.
The second generation privilege separation technique Arbiter [10] allowed
multiple threads to run in the same compartment. However, Arbiter still faces similar
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limitations on parallel memory operations and their evaluation does not use multithreaded benchmarks that have intensive memory operations to demonstrate the system’s parallelism, even though the design aims at concurrent execution for threads
(cf. LO). We identify two major causes of the limitation on Arbiter’s parallelism.
First, the highly serialized memory management in their user-space library incurs
inevitable runtime overhead of up to 400%. Second, the design choice of separating
mm_structs forces their kernel to aggressively synchronize the global process address

space for every thread’s memory descriptors. The synchronization costs increase when
an application performs intensive memory operations or generates a huge amount of
page faults. These limitations on parallelism manifest themselves when running realworld applications (e.g., Firefox) with large inputs (e.g., web server hosting a 100MB
fle). However, the largest input in the authors’ evaluation is only 1MB. In addition,
programmers are on their own to partition applications as the solution does not provide assistance in retroftting applications (cf. EU). As we will show in this chapter,
the SMV model addresses the limitations of the frst and second generation privilege
separation techniques without sacrifcing security or parallelism.
OS-level abstraction mandatory access control (MAC) solutions such as
SELinux [12], AppArmor [11], and Capsicum [17] protect sensitive data at process/thread granularity. However, fne-grained privilege separation for software objects (e.g., arrays) within a process is not supported in these techniques. On the
other hand, SMVs tackle issues for intra-process data protection with capabilities.
PerspicuOS [18] separates privileges between trusted and untrusted kernel components defned by kernel developers using an additional layer of MMU. Such an intrakernel design does not facilitate intra-process privilege separation as SMV does for
user-space applications (cf. GF and EU). These security policies are orthogonal to the
SMV memory policies and SMVs can be used in conjunction with these techniques
to gain additional inter-process protection.
Decentralized information fow control (DIFC) systems allow programmers
to associate secrecy labels with data and enforce information fow to follow security
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policies. HiStar [19] is an OS that fundamentally enforces DIFC that could likely
address intra-process isolation. However, HiStar is not based on a general OS kernel
such as Linux and thus cannot be incrementally deployed to commodity systems.
Moreover, the applications have to be completely rewritten in order to use HiStar
(cf. GF and LO). Thus, the solution is infeasible for legacy software (e.g., Firefox)
in practice. Flume [20] focuses on process-level DIFC for OS-level abstractions (e.g.,
fles, processes) in UNIX but it does not handle intra-process privilege separation
within a multithreaded application. Laminar [21] supports multithreaded application running in its specialized Java virtual machine (cf. GF). However, the additional
layer in the software stack and its dynamic checker incur signifcant runtime overhead
(cf. LO). As noted in Section 2.7.9, byte-granularity checkers in DIFC systems incur high performance overhead in practical applications that have intensive memory
operations (cf. LO).
Software-based fault isolation [22,23] isolates software components within the
same address space by constructing distinct fault domains for code and data. SFI
prevents code from modifying data or jumping to code outside of a fault domain.
Native client [24, 25] utilizes SFI with x86 hardware segmentation for eÿcient reads,
writes, control-fow integrity [26], and component isolation. However, the untrusted
code is statically associated with a specifc fault domain as the approach does not
provide simple means of implementing a dynamic and fexible security policy for
practical multithreaded applications (cf. EU and LO). In contrast, SMVs o˙ers solutions for programmers to structure the protected memory regions in a dynamic and
non-hierarchical manner.
Language-based techniques utilize safe language semantics to provide isolation
for applications written in type-safe languages (e.g. [27, 28]) and implement information fow control for objects within a process (e.g. [29–31]). However, the vast majority
of legacy software are still written in an unsafe language for eÿciency. As a result,
programmers need to completely rewrite their legacy software using safe languages
(cf. GF). Ribbons [32] is a programming model developed entirely for user space that
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provides fne-grained heap isolation for multithreaded applications. While the access privileges of threads are tracked pair-wise between domains hierarchically in user
space in Ribbons, the SMV model leverages the OS memory management subsystem
to organize the access privileges of threads systematically in kernel space at negligible
overhead (cf. EU and LO).
Special hardware support and virtualization technologies is another line of
research that seeks for strong isolation of program secrets. Flicker’s [33] signifcant
overhead due to its intensive use of the TPM chip (cf. NH) makes it impractical
for performance-critical applications (cf. LO). Although TrustVisor [34] mitigates the
overhead by a hypervisor and a software-based TPM chip, the system is impractical for applications that require multiple compartments with di˙erent capabilities
(cf. GF). Fides [35] points out the limitations in TrustVisor and improves it by supporting more fexible secure modules with a dual VM architecture on top of its special
hypervisor. Hypervisors can be used for guest OSs (e.g. SMV OS kernel) on a shared
host while SMVs (providing a richer API) directly run on bare metal at full speed
(cf. GF and LO). The additional software level in the hypervisor introduces overheads
as the VMM intervenes for the guest OSs page tables, causing TLB cache misses.
Recent studies [36–38] by Intel indicate that hardware support for secure computing
will become available on mainstream X86 environments in the near future. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a mechanism to ensure confdentiality and integrity
(but not availability) of a trusted unprivileged software module under an untrusted
OS with limited trusted hardware. SGX protects one component from possible interaction using an “enclave” enforced by hardware. Although the goal of Intel SGX is
similar to SMVs, our pure-software solution allows SMVs to be adopted by any OSs
that have MMU subsystems with commodity hardware (cf. NH). Loki’s [39] tagged
memory architecture, CODOMs’ [40] tagged pages, and CHERI’s [41] capability registers can isolate modules into separate domains with eÿcient access protection check
logic. But these approaches require hypothetical hardware support which make them
incompatible with commodity systems (cf. NH).
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2.3 Threat Model
We assume that the attacker, an unprivileged user without root permissions, can
control a thread in a vulnerable multithreaded program, allocate memory, and fork
more threads up to resource limits on a trusted kernel with sound hardware. The
adversary will try to escalate privileges through the attacker-controlled threads or
gain control of another thread, e.g., by reading or writing data of another module or
executing code of another module. In this model, the adversary may read or write
any data that the controlled thread has access to. The adversary may also attempt
to bypass protection domains by exploiting race conditions between threads or by
leveraging confused deputy attacks, e.g., through the API exported by other threads.
We assume that the OS kernel is not compromised (OS kernel security is an orthogonal
topic [42]) and user-space libraries installed by root users are trusted. We assume
that the access permissions both of the memory views (enforced through SMV) and
for the kernel (enforced through AppArmor, SELinux, or seccomp) are set correctly.

2.4 Objectives
The key objective of the SMV model is to eÿciently protect memory references
of threads to prevent unintentional or malicious accesses to privileged memory areas
during the lifetime of a program. Threads may communicate with other threads
through mutually shared memory areas set up by the programmer through SMVs.
The SMV model restricts the memory boundaries and memory access permissions
for each thread. Without SMVs, an untrusted thread (e.g., a compromised worker
thread) may access arbitrary software objects (e.g., the private key) within its process
(e.g., a web server). Existing programs assume a shared memory space for threads
and SMVs must therefore validate that all threads follow the memory rules defned
by the programmer (cf. Section 2.5.2). Threads that deviate from these memory
reference rules are killed by the system.
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The SMV model aims to strictly confne the memory access boundaries for multithreaded programs while preserving all four desired requirements for intra-process
isolation. We argue in Section 2.5 that the SMV model along with the memory
access enforcement can constrain threads within the programmer-defned memory
boundaries.

2.5 SMV Model Design
The SMV model consists of three abstractions: memory protection domains, secure
memory views, and SMVthreads. The SMV model uses user-defned security policies
to enforce the threads’ privileges in accessing the shared memory space. The fexibility
and programmability of the model allows a programmer to specify the protection
domains using high-level abstractions while enforcing the security policy at the lowest
level of the software stack (page tables) with acceptable runtime overhead.

2.5.1 Memory Protection Domains
We defne a memory protection domain as a contiguous range of virtual memory.
Any memory address can only belong to one memory protection domain. In this way,
a large shared memory space such as the heap can be divided into several distinct sets
of memory protection domains. For example, a process can create a private memory
protection domain that is only accessible by one thread, or a partially shared memory
protection domain such that only threads with explicit privileges can access it. In
addition, an in-memory communication domain can be allocated with global access
privileges so that all threads can exchange data without relying on expensive IPC.
In general, an unprivileged thread cannot tamper with a memory protection domain
even if there exists a defect in the code of the thread. We use the term memory
domain to refer to the memory protection domain in the rest of this chapter.
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2.5.2 Secure Memory Views
We defne a secure memory view (SMV) to be a thread container with a collection
of memory domains. The memory blocks covered by a memory view can only be
accessed by threads explicitly given permission to run in the corresponding privileged
SMV. Therefore, we consider a memory view to be secure.
We defne three abstract operations for defning the composition of an SMV:
• Register(SMV,MD): registers memory domain MD as part of SMV ’s memory view.
• Grant(SMV,MD,P): grants SMV the capability to access memory domain MD with
access privilege P.
• Revoke(SMV,MD): revokes SMV ’s capabilities to access memory domain MD.
We categorize the privileges P of an SMV to access a memory domain into four
operations:
• Read : An SMV can read from the memory domain.
• Write: An SMV can write to the memory domain.
• Execute: An SMV can execute in the memory domain.
• Allocate: An SMV can allocate/deallocate memory space in the memory domain.
The access privileges to each of the memory domains for an SMV can be di˙erent.
Two SMVs can reference the same memory domain but the access privileges can di˙er.
The programmer can set up the SMV’s privileges to access memory domains in the
way needed for the application at hand. For example, multiple threads sharing the
same security context can be assigned to the same SMV to parallelize the workload
(LO). To minimize an application’s attack surface, the programmer can assume the
main parent thread to be the master thread of a program. All the permission modifcations must be done by the master thread and are immutable by child threads.
The SMV model considers any access to a memory domain without proper privileges
to be an SMV invalid memory access. We implemented the privilege enforcement at
the OS kernel level and detail the design in Section 2.6.5.
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2.5.3 SMVthread
An SMVthread is a thread that strictly follows the privileges defned by an SMV to
access memory domains. SMVthreads run in the memory view defned by an SMV and
cannot change to other SMVs. While the popular pthreads have to trust all pthreads
running in the same memory space, SMVthreads distrust other SMVthreads by default.
SMVthreads – unlike pthreads – must explicitly share access to the intrinsically shared

memory space with other SMVthreads. We designed SMVthreads to partially share
the memory space with other SMVthreads according to the policy specifed by the
programmer through the API. Section 2.6.3 explains the implementation of the partially shared page tables for SMVthreads. SMVthreads are glibc-compatible, meaning
that our SMVthreads can directly invoke the library functions in glibc. SMVthreads
can cooperate with pthreads through all the synchronization primitives defned by the
pthreads API. For SMV management, privileged SMVthreads have to invoke the SMV

API to set up the memory boundaries for least privilege enforcement. pthreads can
access the whole process address space. Changing such accesses would hamper the
correctness of legacy programs that do not require any memory segregation (backward
compatibility). While possible, programmers are advised against mixing SMVthreads
and pthreads in one process when an application requires isolation as pthreads will
have unrestricted access to all memory of the process.

2.5.4 SMV API: User Space Library
We implemented our SMV model as a user-space library that o˙ers an API to support partially shared memory multithreading programming in C and C++. Table 2.2
summarizes the primary SMV API with descriptions of the main functions. For
instance, a programmer can use memdom_create to create a memory domain and
memdom_alloc to allocate memory blocks that are only accessible by SMVthreads

running in the privileged SMVs. Each memory domain and SMV has a unique ID
assigned by the SMV model in the system. SMVthreads are integrated with pthreads
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Table 2.2.: List of primary SMV API.
SMV API

Description
Initialize the main process to use the SMV model. If

int smv_main_init (bool allow_global)

allow_global is true, allow child threads to access global

memory domains. Otherwise distrust all threads by default.
Creates a new memory domain, initializes the memory

int memdom_create (void)

region, and returns the kernel-assigned memory domain
ID.
Creates a new SMV and returns the kernel-assigned

int smv_create (void)

smv_id.
pthread_t smvthread_create (int smv_id,

(void*)func_ptr,

Creates an SMVthread to run in the SMV specifed by

struct smv_data* args)

smv_id and returns a glibc-compatible pthread_t identi-

void* memdom_alloc (int memdom_id, unsigned long size)

Allocates a memory block of size bytes in memory do-

void memdom_free (void* data)

Deallocates a memory block previously allocated by

fer.
main memdom_id.
memdom_alloc.
int memdom_priv_grant (int memdom_id, int smv_id, int

Grants the privileges privs to access memory domain

privs)

memdom_id for SMV svm_id and returns new privileges.

int memdom_priv_revoke (int memdom_id, int smv_id, int

Revokes the privileges privs to access memory domain

privs)

memdom_id from SMV svm_id and returns new privi-

leges.
int memdom_kill (int memdom_id)

Deletes the memory domain with memdom_id from the
process.

int smv_kill (int smv_id)

Deletes the SMV with smv_id from the process.

for easier synchronization and every SMVthread thus also has an associated pthread_t
identifer. Note that casting an SMVthread to a pthread does not bypass the privilege
checks. The SMV interface allows programmers to structure the process memory
space into distinct memory domains with di˙erent privileges for SMVthreads and to
manage the desired security policy. Furthermore, our library provides options for
programmers to automatically override related function calls to signifcantly reduce
the porting e˙orts. For example, pthread_create can be automatically replaced by
smvthread_create, which internally allocates a private memory domain for the newly
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Figure 2.1.: SMV architecture.

created SMVthread. Similarly, when an SMVthread calls malloc, the library allocates
memory in the calling thread’s private memory domain.

2.5.5 SMV Architecture
The SMV architecture consists of two parts: a user space programming interface
and a kernel space privilege enforcement mechanism. Figure 2.1 gives an overview. In
short, a user space application can call the SMV API to use the SMV model. In the
OS kernel, the SMV kernel module is responsible for exchanging the messages between
the user space component and the kernel memory management subsystem. We added
SMV metadata management to the OS memory management subsystem to record the
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memory access privileges for the SMVs. We modifed the page table management logic
to support partially shared page tables and added the SMV privilege checks to the
page fault handler that enforces the memory access control.
With the user space interface and the support from the OS kernel, applications
can explicitly structure the intrinsically shared process memory space into distinct
memory domains with di˙erent access privileges without any hardware modifcations.
Therefore, our approach can be run directly on today’s commodity hardware (NH).

2.5.6 Application Examples
The SMV model allows privilege separation of individual components and data
regions in an application. We present one example of the popular design model in
general multithreaded applications and two concrete application examples of how the
SMV model can protect applications by organizing the process address space with
di˙erent privileges for threads (GF and EU).

Producer-Consumer Model
First, the SMV model can support the common producer-consumer model with
strict memory isolation while maintaining eÿcient data sharing. Figure 2.2 illustrates how the SMV model can secure interacting components according to a generic
producer-consumer model that is employed by all the applications in PARSEC we
evaluated. In this example, the SMVthreads run in the process address space that
contains four SMVs and six memory domains. The SMVs confne the memory access
privileges of SMVthreads according to the security policy. In this case, the queue
domain is the shared memory domain for all SMVthreads to cooperate with each
other, but any write or allocate request from the producer SMV to the consumer
domains is prohibited; only reads are permitted. The secure communication domain
works as a one-way communication channel for the master SMVthread to transmit
data to the consumer SMVthreads and is inaccessible to the producer SMVthread due

22

Key
Master
SMV

Producer
SMV

Master
Domain

Producer
Domain

Process
SMV
SMVthread
Memory Domain
Secure
Communication
Domain

Queue Domain

Read Privilege
Write Privilege
Allocate Privilege

Consumer
Domain

Consumer
Domain

Consumer
SMV 1

Consumer
SMV 2

Arrow points from
source SMV to
destination domain

Figure 2.2.: Security-enhanced producer/consumer model with fne-grained memory
protection domains.

to the restricted privileges of the producer SMV. In this case, the SMV model strictly
enforces memory access boundaries, constraining memory safety bugs to the current
component’s memory view.

Case Study: Cherokee Web Server
Cherokee [43] is a high-performance and light-weight multithreaded web server.
To isolate connections, Cherokee uses worker threads to handle incoming requests
stored in per-thread connection queues. One worker thread handles all the requests
coming from the same connection. However, only one worker thread on the server
needs to be compromised to leak sensitive information. To provide an alternative
for isolating server workers in di˙erent processes, we show how the SMV model can
compartmentalize the process memory into memory domains and provide reasonable
isolation for the multithreaded Cherokee web server. As shown in Figure 2.3, the
SMV model defnes the memory boundaries for worker SMVthreads and enforces the
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Figure 2.3.: Security-enhanced Cherokee web server.

memory access privileges to protect the server. The SSL connections are handled
only by the SMVthreads running in SMV 3 that have the privilege to access worker
domain 3, which contains the server’s private key. If SMVthreads in SMV 2 (handling
only HTTP requests) make any attempt to access the private key, the SMV model
will reject such invalid memory accesses because of insuÿcient privileges. In this way,
when an exploited worker thread attempts to access memory in an invalid domain,
the SMV model detects such invalid accesses and stops further attacks triggered by
the memory bugs (e.g., CVE-2004-1097). The original pthread Cherokee server does
not have this security guarantee since all the threads can access the complete process
address space (with unanimously shared permission). We show how accessing invalid
memory domains is prevented by the SMV model in Section 2.7.5.

Case Study: Mozilla Firefox Web Browser
SMVs allow multithreaded web browsers such as Firefox and its JavaScript engine
SpiderMonkey to achieve strict compartment isolation enforced by hardware pro-
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tection, preventing one malicious origin from accessing sensitive data such as bank
accounts hosted by another origin. Figure 2.4 presents an example of how the SMV
model can isolate browser tabs in SMVs based on the same-origin policy [44]. With
SMVs, the malicious origin TrojanWorld cannot escape from its compartment to access the PayPal banking account (add recipient account by allocating memory or
transfer money to attacker’s account by writing to memory) or read the user credentials hosted by eBay. Such strong isolation guarantees inspired Google to design
Chrome to use process isolation for its rendering process.

2.6 Implementation
This section details the OS kernel level implementation of the SMV model and
discusses its security guarantees. We modifed the Linux kernel version 4.4.5 for the
x64 architectures to support the SMV model. Table 2.3 summarizes the component
sizes in our prototype.
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2.6.1 SMV Communication Channel
We developed an SMV loadable kernel module (LKM) that allows the user-space
SMV API to communicate with our kernel using the Netlink socket family. Once
loaded, the SMV LKM is e˙ectively part of the kernel. The SMV LKM works as a
dispatcher in the SMV model that sanitizes the messages from the user space SMV
API and invokes SMV-related kernel functions.
Security guarantee. The attacker cannot replace our SMV LKM with a malicious SMV LKM to perform a man-in-the-middle attack and escalate permissions for
a given SMVthread. Such a system-wide change requires the attacker to have root
privilege on the system.

2.6.2 Metadata Management
To eÿciently maintain the state of the processes that have SMVthreads, we added
two major objects to the OS kernel. (1) memdom_struct: memory domain metadata for tracing the virtual memory area and the memory domains mappings. (2)
SMV_struct: the SMV privilege metadata for accessing memory domains. These

Table 2.3.: Summary of component sizes in SMV.
LOC† Source fles

Protection level

SMV API

781

6

user space

SMV LKM

443

2

kernel

SMV MM‡

1, 717

24

kernel

†

Lines of code computed by cloc.

‡

SMV MM stands for SMV memory management, which
is integrated into the OS memory management subsystem as we show in Figure 2.1.
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kernel objects cooperate with each other to maintain the fne-grained privilege information of each SMV in a process.
Security guarantee. The metadata is allocated in kernel memory space and is
not mutable by any user space programs without proper privileges through our API.
Memory bugs in user space programs cannot a˙ect the integrity of the metadata
stored in kernel memory. One of the main sources of kernel 0-day attacks is the use
of uninitialized bytes in kernel memory (e.g., CVE-2010-4158) that allows local users
to read sensitive information. The SMV model sanitizes the metadata by initializing
objects to avoid any potential information leakage from this added attack surface. Our
kernel inherits the original kernel’s garbage collection system using reference counting
to ensure that the additional metadata does not create any dangling pointers.

2.6.3 Partially Shared Memory Space
In the SMV model, SMVthreads can be perceived as untrusted tasks by default.
Therefore, our kernel has to partially separate the kernel objects; it also maintains the
consistent process address space for the SMV model. Overall, our kernel: (1) separates
the memory space of SMVs by using a page global directory (pgd_t) for each SMV;
(2) frees memory for all SMVs when one SMVthread frees the process memory; (3)
loads thread-private pgd_t into the CR3 register during a context switch.
All SMVthreads in a process share the same mm_struct that describes the process
address space. Our kernel allocates one pgd_t for each SMV in a process and stores all
pgd_ts in a process’s mm_struct. SMVthreads use their private page tables to locate

memory pages, yet their permissions to the same page might di˙er. Note that we
designed SMVs to protect thread stacks as well. To ensure the integrity of the process
memory space, the page tables of all SMVs need to be updated when the kernel frees
the process page tables or when kswapd reclaims page frames. The original kernel
avoids reloading page tables during a context switch if two tasks belong to the same
process (thus using the same mm_struct). We modifed our kernel to reload page tables
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and fush all TLB entries if one of the switching threads is an SMVthread. Note that
processors equipped with tagged TLBs could mitigate the fushing overhead. However,
SMVs do not rely on this hardware optimization feature in order to function correctly
(NH).
Based on our extensive experiments, we found that using di˙erent mm_structs to
separate the address space for threads is overkill and could signifcantly impact the
performance for practical applications (LO). This is because all the memory operations related to mm_struct need to be synchronized in an aggressive manner in order
to maintain the consistent process address space for all threads (e.g., rotating the
vm_area_struct red-black tree). Using the clone syscall without CLONE_VM fag to

isolate a thread’s address space from its parent is another approach. However, this
approach has two main drawbacks. First, the kernel creates a new mm_struct for
the new thread if CLONE_VM is not set. This leads to frequent synchronization and
imposes overhead. Second, debugging (e.g., GDB [45]) and tracing memory activity
(e.g., Valgrind [46]) become extremely diÿcult: GDB has to be constantly detached
from one process and then attached to another in order to debug a parallel program;
Valgrind does not support programs with clone calls. In contrast, using the same
mm_struct preserves the system-wide process address space assumption and allows

the kernel to separate process address space for threads eÿciently.
Security guarantee. The security features of the partially shared memory space
rely on the protection guaranteed by the original kernel. The memory management
subsystem in the kernel space is completely unknown to user space programs. The
attacker has to exploit the permission bits of the page table entries (PTEs) for a
thread to break the security features provided by our kernel. We argue that this kind
of exploit is highly unlikely without serious DRAM bugs such as rowhammer [47].
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2.6.4 Forking SMVthreads
The SMV API uses pthread_create to create a regular pthread and signals the
kernel to convert the pthread to an SMVthread before the SMVthread starts execution.
The kernel instructs the SMVthread to use the private page tables defned by the SMV
that the SMVthread runs in. Once an SMVthread is created, the kernel turns on the
using_smv fag stored in the process’s mm_struct so that future memory operations

must go through additional privilege checks.
To simplify porting e˙orts, the SMV API provides an option to override all
pthread_create calls and automatically allocate private memory domains for each
SMVthread.

Security guarantee. The mm_struct of a thread is allocated in kernel space and
used solely by the kernel. There are no interfaces that allow user space programs to
directly or indirectly modify the memory descriptor. This strong isolation between
user and kernel space is guaranteed by the trusted OS kernel. In addition, the atomic
fork procedure ensures that the attacker cannot intercept the fork procedure and steal
the memory descriptor for the malicious thread.

2.6.5 Page Fault Handler
Figure 2.5 shows the fow chart of the page fault handler in our kernel. The
additional checks are surrounded by the gray box with a dotted line. Our kernel kills
the SMVthread that triggers an SMV invalid (cf. Section 2.5.2) page fault by sending
a segmentation fault signal. For the privileged SMVthreads, our kernel performs SMV
demand paging to eÿciently handle the page faults.
Indeed, since the SMVs use private page tables to separate SMVs’ memory views,
using the original demand paging routine for SMVthreads is insuÿcient as the page
fault handler only updates the page tables for the current SMV, which causes inconsistent process address space. To solve this problem, our kernel tracks all the faulted
pages of a process in the SMV shadow page tables. The page fault handler deals with
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Figure 2.5.: Page fault handler fow chart. The SMV kernel performs additional
privilege checks (marked in the gray box).

faults by using the SMV shadow page tables and then copies the page table entry of
the fault from the shadow page tables to the running SMVthread’s page tables. Note
that one process has only one set of shadow page tables, which only serve as quick
reference with no permission implications when SMVthreads locate a memory page.
Security guarantee. The page fault handler cannot be accessed, changed, or
abused by the attacker as it resides in the lowest level of the software stack. The
PTE bits force invalid memory accesses to be trapped to the kernel for the additional
privilege checks. To access a privileged memory region, the attacker must frst get
around the page fault handler. However, such a scenario is infeasible because the
kernel memory management subsystem must intervene and prepare the data page
before the attacker can access the privileged memory region.
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2.7 Evaluation
The goal of our evaluation is to demonstrate that the SMV model has all four
desired requirements when enforcing least privilege memory views for multithreaded
applications in practice. We show that the SMV model supports di˙erent types of
multithreaded programs with fexible policies (GF), requires minimal code changes
for legacy software (EU), requires no hardware modifcations (NH), and incurs negligible runtime overheads while supporting complex thread interactions and extremely
intensive memory allocation/free calls in parallel (LO).

2.7.1 Experiment Setup
We measured the performance of our SMV model on a system with Intel i7-4790
CPU with 4 cores clocked at 2.8GHz and 16GB of RAM for our modifed x86 64-bit
Linux kernel 4.4.5 Ubuntu 14.04.2 SMP (NH). The benchmarks are compiled into two
versions: pthread and SMVthread.

2.7.2 Example Policy
SMVthreads cannot access privileged memory domains without being explicitly

granted the proper privilege. To test this security guarantee in all of our experiments,
the number of domains was set to N +1, where N is the number of worker threads and
the additional domain serves as a global pool for threads to securely share data. Each
worker has its own private memory domain that can only be accessed by itself. We
do not claim that the proposed policy is optimal but instead focus on the mechanics
to enforce the policy. Setting up alternative policies is possible (GF).

2.7.3 Robustness Test
To examine the robustness, we tested our modifed Linux kernel with the Linux
Test Project (LTP) [48] developed and maintained by IBM, Cisco, Fujitsu, SUSE Red
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Hat, Oracle and others. Specifcally, we used the runltp script in the LTP package
to test the memory management, flesystem, disk I/O, scheduler, and IPC. All stress
tests completed without error. We did not observe any system crashes.

2.7.4 Inspecting Isolation
The SMV model treats invalid memory accesses as segmentation faults. Suppose
an attacker’s thread triggers a segmentation fault by accessing an invalid memory
domain on purpose. The main process will crash to prevent further information leakage. Our SMV library provides detailed memory logs to the programmer. Listing 2.1
shows an example of the memory activity log. For crashes due to wrong isolation
setup, the logs can help the programmer immediately identify the SMVthread that
accessed the invalid protection domain and subsequently rectify the object compartmentalization. In addition, our library provides detailed stack traces for debugging.
The logs and stack traces are unreadable by the attacker when debugging mode is
disabled. A binary compiled without debugging option makes it impossible for an
attacker to learn about memory activity.

2.7.5 Security Evaluation
To further understand how the SMV model o˙ers strong intra-process isolation,
we systematically discuss the security guarantees described in Section 2.6.
Trusted computing base. The TCB of the SMV model contains the SMV
LKM and SMV MM with kernel level protection (cf. Table 2.3). The SMV API
is untrusted and resides in user space as system library. The attacker may try to
perform an SMV API call with a malicious intent to escalate permissions for an
SMVthread. The SMV LKM sanitizes all user space messages sent into the kernel and

verifes that the SMVthread executing the API call has the correct permissions for the
requested change. The attacker may attempt to leverage the misuse of the SMV API
to invalidate the memory isolation guarantee provided by the SMV model. Therefore,
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the security of the application relies on the correctness of the memory isolation setup.
Once the memory boundaries are defned, all SMVthreads must follow the memory
access rules defned by the programmer. Note that unprivileged users without root
permission cannot compromise the SMV LKM (cf. Section 2.6.1 security guarantee).
The SMV model also relies on the privilege level enforcement imposed by the
original Linux kernel to make sure that the attacker cannot tamper with the SMV
model operating in the kernel space. To bypass the kernel protection, the attacker
must hijack the page tables of a privileged thread or modify the metadata stored in
the kernel space. The original Linux kernel ensures the integrity of the metadata
and memory descriptors for all threads in the system. Using wrong page tables or
metadata will cause a thread to be killed once the kernel detects the tainted kernel
data structures. Thus, it is impossible for the attacker to exploit the metadata of any
thread without kernel 0-day vulnerabilities (cf. Section 2.6.2 security guarantee).
In addition to the software TCB, the SMV model also relies on the hardware’s
correctness. The hardware vendors perform signifcant correctness validation. We believe that the security features o˙ered by sound hardware are unlikely for the attacker
to subvert (cf. Section 2.6.3 security guarantee). Given the extremely small source
code base (less than 2000 LOC), we believe that the SMV’s TCB could be formally
verifed.
TOCTTOU attack: stealing page tables. The attacker may attempt to
steal the page tables of a privileged thread by hijacking its memory descriptor. We
consider an oracle attacker who knows precisely when and how to launch a time of
check to time of use (TOCTTOU) attack to steal the page tables of a privileged
thread. If the attack succeeds, the attacker’s malicious thread will use the hijacked
page tables and read sensitive data in the privileged memory domain before the
thread crashes. Assume the attacker can fork threads up to the system limit with
the objective to hijack the page tables of an about-to-run privileged thread in the
fork procedure, which is the only point for the attacker to exploit the pgd_t pointer.
However, the malicious thread has to wait until the privileged SMVthread fnishes
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Listing 2.1: Kernel log obtained by dmesg command.
1

[smv]Created memdom 2, start addr: 0x00f0f000, end addr: 0x00f10000

2

[smv]SMVthread pid 11157 attempt to access addr 0x00f0f0e0 in memdom 2

3

[smv]Addr 0x00f0f0e0 is protected by memdom 2

4

[smv]Read permission granted to SMVthread pid 11157 in SMV 2

5

[smv]SMVthread pid 11155 attempt to access addr 0x00f0f260 in memdom 2

6

[smv]SMV 1 is not in memdom 2

7

[smv]Detected INVALID memory reference to: 0x00f0f260

8

[smv]INVALID memory request issued by SMVthread pid 11155 in SMV 1

9

[smv]<6>chorekee[11155]: segfault at f0f260 ip 00007f09ba7d6656 error 4

the page tables setup in order to request the kernel to prepare its unprivileged page
tables. Therefore, the attacker cannot intercept the fork procedure and steal the
page tables. We conducted an experiment where 1,023 malicious SMVthreads tried
to hijack the page tables of a privilege SMVthread. During the one million runs of
the security test, every SMVthread used the correct page tables for its memory view
(cf. Section 2.6.4 security guarantee).
E˙ectiveness of the SMV model. Listing 2.1 shows the kernel log when an
invalid memory access is detected by the SMV model. In this example, the unprivileged SMVthread pid 11155 in SMV 1 tries to access memory in the privilege memory
domain that stores the server’s private key, which is only accessible by SMVthread pid
11157 in SMV 2. At line 5, the attempt to read the invalid memory domain triggers
the page fault. The kernel rejects the invalid memory request by sending a segmentation fault signal to the unprivileged SMVthread pid 11155 at line 9, stopping the
unprivileged SMVthread from accessing the server’s private key. The privilege checks
cannot be bypassed because the reference monitor is implemented entirely in the page
fault handler, and arbitrary page table manipulation is beyond the attacker’s scope
(cf. Section 2.6.5 security guarantee).
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2.7.6 PARSEC 3.0 Benchmarks
Overview. The multithreaded PARSEC benchmarks include several emerging
workloads with non-trivial thread interaction. Both data-parallel and pipeline parallelization models are covered in the benchmarks with coarse to fne granularity. We
used all benchmarks in [49], covering all application domains that were originally multithreaded using the standard pthreads. The evaluated benchmarks all employ the
producer-consumer pattern (cf. Section 2.5.6) that is pervasive in systems programs
and parallelization models. We used the parsecmgnt tool in the PARSEC package to
run the benchmarks with minimum number of threads set to four for the large inputs
as defned by the benchmarks.
Assessment of porting e˙ort. We ported the PARSEC benchmarks by replacing each pthread with an SMVthread running in its own SMV with a private memory
domain. In each program, the main program allocates a shared memory domain to
store the working set for SMVthreads. The porting procedure consisted of three parts:
(1) including the header fles to use the SMV API, (2) setting up memory domains
and SMVs in the main program, and (3) replacing the pthreads with SMVthreads. All
these changes required only 2 LOC changes as the SMV API eliminates the refactoring burden (EU). We needed to add only 1 line to include the header fle and another
to initialize the main process to use the SMV model. The SMV API automatically
intercepts pthread_create and malloc and replaces them with smvthread_create and
memdom_alloc calls. Therefore, each SMVthread could automatically allocate mem-

ory in its private memory domain (cf. Section 2.5.4).
The security-enhanced PARSEC benchmarks demonstrate a general case that
could be applied to any multithreaded programs written in C/C++ (GF), even with
the presence of extremely intensive memory allocation/free calls in parallel. In addition, the intra-process isolation can help prevent attacks that arbitrarily modify data
on the stack using malicious threads, e.g., ROP-based attacks. One study has shown
that an attacker can perform ROP and use gadgets (16 payloads is enough for > 80%
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Figure 2.6.: Runtime overhead of the SMV model for the multithreaded applications
in the PARSEC benchmark suite.

of GNU coreutils [50]) to achieve Turing completeness. Note that ASLR/stack canaries have been proven ine˙ective to protect against information leakage [51]. With
SMV, programmers can secure the system with few changed lines of source code while
also handling nontrivial thread interaction, if needed.
Performance. Figure 2.6 shows the runtime overhead of the ported PARSEC
benchmarks with 10 runs for each program. The results show that the SMV model
incurs negligible runtime overhead. The overall geometric mean of the runtime overhead is only 2.07% (LO) and the maximum of the runtime overhead occurs for dedup
due to the huge amount of page faults and the highly intensive parallel memory
operations.

2.7.7 Cherokee Web Server
Overview. The original Cherokee server uses a per-thread memory bu˙er system
for resource management to isolate threads from remote connections. We leveraged
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the SMV model to provide Cherokee with the OS level privilege enforcement for
di˙erent server components. Then we compared the throughput of our securityenhanced Cherokee with the original Cherokee.
Assessment of porting e˙ort. We enhanced the security of the Cherokee
version 1.2.104 server as illustrated in Section 2.5.6. The user-space SMV library
automatically replaced pthread_create with smvthread_create to create SMVthreads
for the workers to handle client requests. Each SMVthread worker ran in its own
SMV with a private memory domain which is inaccessible by other workers. All
other shared objects such as the mutex are allocated in a shared memory domain and
accessible by all workers. We modifed only 2 LOC of Cherokee to enforce the least
privilege memory access with the SMV model (EU). We believe that the negligible
porting e˙ort demonstrates the practicability of the SMV model to protect real-world
applications.
Performance. We used ApacheBench to measure the server throughput for the
original and security-enhanced Cherokee. Both versions of Cherokee hosted two kinds
of web content: (a) social networking web pages, and (b) large streaming fles. Based
on the total transfer size per page reported in Alexa top one million websites [52], we
tested web page sizes from moderate amount of content to abundant media objects
(100KB to 8MB). We also evaluated the performance of both servers hosting large
streaming fles (50MB and 100MB) to show the practicability of our security-enhanced
Cherokee. The Cherokee server process created 40 worker threads by default to
handle client requests. The client initiated the ApacheBench for 100,000 requests
with concurrency level set to four (matches the number of cores). We conducted the
experiment 20 times for each object size and present the results in Figure 2.7. Overall,
the SMV model reduced throughput by only 0.69% in exchange for strictly enforcing
a least privilege security policy (LO).
We also ported the popular Apache httpd-2.4.18 with only 2 LOC (EU). Using
Apache as a fle sharing server (GF) to host large objects with size of 10MB, 50MB,
100MB, and 1GB we conducted the same experiment. Overall, SMVs reduced the
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throughput of the httpd server by only 0.93% (LO). As Cherokee already presents the
case for web servers, we exclude the details for Apache httpd due to space limitation.

2.7.8 Mozilla Firefox Web Browser
Overview. The developers of modern web browsers have made tremendous efforts to ensure resource isolation. In 2011, Firefox introduced an abstraction called
“compartments” for its JavaScript engine SpiderMonkey to manage JavaScript heaps
with security in mind [53]. However, the isolation is not enforced by any mechanism
stronger than the compartments’ logical boundaries. As a result, any memory corruption can still lead to serious attacks. Here we demonstrate that the SMV model can
be easily deployed to protect Firefox’s JavaScript engine from memory corruption by
confning each compartment to access only its private and the system compartments.
Assessment of porting e˙ort. Firefox uses threads for UI rendering, processing network packets, monitoring browser status, handling JavaScript jobs, etc. In
our evaluation, we replaced Firefox 45.0 SpiderMonkey’s NSPR (Netscape Portable
Runtime) threads with SMVthreads running in a private memory domain by adding
a new thread type named PR_SMV_THREAD to the NSPR library. SpiderMonkey
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Figure 2.8.: Runtime overhead of security-enhanced Mozilla Firefox web browser.

creates 8 threads (1 thread per core + 4 excess threads) in total. We modifed only
12 LOC of the entire Firefox source to use the SMV model. Although we designed a
per-tab isolation policy, the workloads of individual JavaScript benchmark suites are
run in the same tab. For example, JetStream executes 40 benchmark programs in
the same tab. The performance numbers faithfully report the overhead for privilege
checks as each memory page reference is monitored by our page fault handler.
Performance. We evaluated our security-enhanced Firefox with four popular
JavaScript benchmarks and report the numbers in Figure 2.8. The overall geometric
mean for all benchmarks is only 1.89%. The performance numbers report the overhead
when Firefox performs additional privilege checks for SpiderMonkey’s helper threads.
We believe that such negligible overhead numbers allow eÿcient and strong isolation
for multithreaded browsers to be used in practice and provide the Mozilla team an
alternative to the ongoing multi-process Firefox e10s project [54].

2.7.9 Limitations
The low performance overhead for checking privileges in the SMV model builds
on the virtual memory protection at page granularity. At this point, the SMV model
does not guard against unprivileged memory references within the same page as the
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kernel relies on page table entry (PTE) permission bits. However, poorly organized
data structures mixing privileged and non-privileged data within a region are intrinsically insecure and avoided by real-world software (e.g., Hoard [55] memory allocator,
connection bu˙ers in Cherokee, worker pools in Apache httpd, compartments in Firefox). Therefore, SMVs can be seamlessly integrated into modern software, eliminating
the chances for threads to unintentionally access the same page while enforcing memory boundaries at kernel level. Software monitors for byte-granularity protection has
inevitably high overhead (e.g., decentralized information fow control systems) since
the memory boundary is neither supported by hardware nor the kernel subsystem,
making every memory load/store instruction a candidate for a privilege check. In
contrast, page-granularity o˙ers strong memory isolation and superior performance
with hardware/kernel support.
Although SMVs cannot protect against malicious library threads once they are
installed on the system (requires root privilege, which is out of scope), a user can
compile any third-party threading libraries to use SMVs, as we demonstrated in the
PARSEC benchmark with GThread in vips and RTThread in raytrace.

2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation
of SMVs, a memory subsystem that allows eÿcient memory compartmentalization
across concurrent threads. SMVs yield a comprehensive architecture with all four desired requirements – genericity and fexibility, ease of use, no hardware modifcations,
and low runtime overhead – for eÿcient fne-grained intra-process memory separation in multithreaded applications. Our performance evaluation demonstrates that
the SMV model imposes negligible overhead in exchange for greatly improved security guarantees, enforcing intra-process isolation for concurrent threads. The runtime
overhead of the multithreaded benchmark PARSEC for using the SMV model is only
2.07% overall with only 2 LOC changes. For popular web servers, the reduction in
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throughput is only 0.69% overall for Cherokee and 0.93% overall for Apache httpd.
Both applications required only 2 LOC changes. We also showed that the real-world
web browser Firefox can be easily ported to the SMV model with only 1.89% runtime overhead overall, requiring only 12 LOC modifcations to the large code base
(13M LOC). The simplicity of the porting e˙ort allows legacy software to be quickly
adapted to the SMV model. In summary, we believe that the SMV model can greatly
reduce the vulnerabilities caused by improper software component isolation and encourages more research on the eÿcient and practical intra-process isolation for general
multithreaded applications.
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3 MEMORY SUBSYSTEM FOR CONSISTENCY
This chapter presents a memory subsystem [56] for persisting program memory for
existing multithreaded C/C++ programs. Our extensive evaluation shows that our
memory system yields good performance with strong consistency guarantees.

3.1 Overview
Memristor [1], phase-change memory [2], and other emerging non-volatile memory
(NVM) technologies will provide disk-like persistence but at latency as low as mainmemory (DRAM) devices [57]. These NVM devices will be accessible by memory
instructions, and will result in high performance, fault tolerant programs that avoid
the overheads of traditional persistent media, such as deep software layers and the cost
of serializing and storing data. Programs may even eliminate the distinction between
in-memory versus on-disk representations of data. Recent partnership announcements
from Intel-Micron [57] and HPE-SanDisk [58] aim to bring this memory-centric computing to consumers. Unfortunately, to fully beneft from low latency persistence,
developers need to re-architect both system and application software [59].
When manipulating persistent data directly, applications need to ensure that failures during updates do not end up corrupting data. As an example, a failure during
insertion of an element to a persistent linked list should not result in dangling pointers or other corruptions. A safe way to manipulate persistent data is to ensure that
data structure updates are failure atomic, i.e., even in the presence of failures, either
all or none of the updates are refected in the NVM. The challenge in implementing
failure atomicity is to correctly handle partial updates even in the presence of multithreading, volatile caches, and reordering of NVM writes by the processor. Managing
persistent data structures is costly due to these challenges (e.g., frequently fushing
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cache lines to NVM is very costly [60]). For any persistent programming system to
be practical, its overheads should be low enough that applications actually beneft
from using NVM.
Recently proposed frameworks provide multiple ways to directly manipulate NVM
data structures [61–63]. Application developers can either rewrite their program to
use durable transactions (NV-Heaps [62], Mnemosyne [63]) or rely on the compiler
and runtime to infer failure atomic regions from locks (Atlas [61]). These systems
track persistent data at a very fne-granularity, such as at the level of individual
stores, and use cache fushes and write-ahead logging to correctly recover from failures. Unfortunately, the high overheads of tracking, logging, and managing volatile
caches in these systems results in a huge performance gap, sometimes an order of
magnitude slowdown, between unmodifed DRAM based applications and their crash
tolerant versions (Section 3.6.5). Certain systems propose processor modifcations to
ameliorate the cost of cache fushes and ordering of NVM writes but these systems
do not work on today’s processors [62, 64].
Our goal is to provide a simple transition path for existing C/C++ programs to
leverage non-volatile memory. We want applications to use NVM with few or no
program modifcations, and yet have good performance on today’s processors. Our
key observation is that, for many applications, the high overheads of maintaining logs
can be reduced substantially by using redo logs in combination with coarse-grained
tracking, such as at the level of memory pages.
We propose NVthreads, a memory subsystem we implemented as a threading library that adds durability guarantees to existing multithreaded C/C++ programs.
NVthreads uses two techniques to provide failure atomicity. First, NVthreads executes a multithreaded program as a multi-process program, using virtual memory
to bu˙er intermediate changes when data structures may be inconsistent. When
program data is in a consistent state, NVthreads commits modifed memory pages
to a durable log for recovery. By using the operating system’s copy-on-write mechanism, NVthreads can eÿciently bu˙er uncommitted writes (unlike the costly software
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transactional memory approach in Mnemosyne [63] or eager cache fushes in Atlas’
undo logs [61]), and requires only a redo log to recover. Second, it builds on the
observation that synchronization operations, such as lock acquire and release, provide enough information to determine the boundaries of failure atomic regions [61].
Instead of requiring programs to be re-written with durable transactions, NVthreads
adds durability semantics by automatically inferring when data is safe to write to
persistent memory. While NVthreads’ design can also be used to implement durable
transactions, our current approach of using locks to infer consistency boundaries
means that programs require very few modifcations to start using NVM.
NVthreads uses multiple techniques to ensure good performance. Its approach of
using virtual memory to track data structure modifcations is in stark contrast to recent systems that track durable data at the level of individual words [63] or stores [61].
NVthreads reduces the overheads of ordering writes to NVM by eliminating the need
to fush data after each program write, and requiring that only log entries be ordered.
Even though NVM will be byte-addressable, our evaluation shows the importance of
coarse-grained tracking of program writes, i.e., at the level of 4KB memory pages, for
good performance. In fact, NVthreads is 2×–10× faster than Mnemosyne [63] and
more than 2× faster than Atlas [61], both of which use fne-grained memory management. Additionally, NVthreads uses less space to store metadata and logs compared
to these systems.
For many workloads in the PARSEC [49] and Phoenix [65] benchmarks NVthreads
incurs modest overheads while making data structures durable. We use an emulator to
show that NVthreads’ performance results are robust even if NVM devices are much
slower than DRAM. By using NVthreads and NVM, the persistent versions of programs are 15% to 22× faster than using solid disk drives to store logs. Our evaluation
on a K-means clustering program shows that NVthreads helps programs converge up
to 1.9× faster after a failure versus their non-durable counterparts. Finally, we integrate NVthreads with Tokyo Cabinet, a high performance key-value store, and show
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that for a modest increase in overheads it provides the same durability guarantees
and without the need for custom transactional code.
The contributions of this chapter are:
- A memory subsystem that infers when data structures are consistent and adds
durability semantics with very few program modifcations.
- Novel mechanisms that use process memory to bu˙er uncommitted writes and
track the data at memory page level, thus avoiding undo logs and the need to
instrument each program write.
- Extensive evaluation that shows that the NVthreads’ approach has low overheads, and outperforms Mnemosyne and Atlas. Iterative applications require
only tens of lines of recovery code and converge faster by resuming after failures.

3.2 Challenges in Using Non-volatile Memory
Non-volatile memory (NVM) devices retain data even after a power loss, yet have
access characteristics similar to DRAM and higher density than DRAM. In this subsection we review basic characteristics of NVM technologies and the challenges faced
by application developers.

3.2.1 Non-volatile Memory
New NVM technologies such as PCM [2], memristor [1], and STT-MRAM [66],
will have access latencies similar to DRAM, which is three orders of magnitude faster
than fash. Unlike fash and disks, these NVM devices will also be byte addressable,
meaning they can be accessed through memory instructions, rather than requiring
block-granularity read and write operations. Given these advantages, it is conceivable
that NVM devices will not only be deployed as PCIe-attached devices (replacement of
SSDs) but also be directly attached to the memory bus (similar to DRAM). However,
even in such architectures we expect CPU caches to be volatile, and DRAM and NVM
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to coexist. While current applications will continue to work on NVM devices, they
will not automatically take advantage of the low latency durability.

3.2.2 Design Issues
There are multiple challenges that need to be solved before programs can use
NVM for fault tolerance.
Data structure consistency. NVM-aware solutions need to ensure data consistency
even in the presence of failures. Consider Figure 3.1 where a multithreaded program
adds an element to a doubly linked list. If a crash occurs during insertion, it is
possible that the new element’s back pointer is not set correctly, thus leaving the list
inconsistent. As memory is persistent, after the crash, the program will not be able
to proceed correctly.
Volatile caches. Even though programs will be able to directly access NVM, the
underlying hardware may cache data in the volatile CPU caches, and reorder stores
to NVM. Unfortunately, there is no easy and eÿcient way to determine what data has
been persisted. In Figure 3.1, even if a crash occurred after the program executed line
10, the updates may not have reached the NVM, and the list could be inconsistent.
Therefore, NVM-aware systems need to manage the movement of data from volatile
caches to NVM.
Performance and programmability. Since objects in the heap will reside in the
NVM, programs no longer need to bear the overheads of serializing and storing persistent data in flesystems. Still, there are performance and programmability costs
associated with keeping heap objects consistent. For example, a possible solution to
correctly handle state in volatile caches is to fush cache lines after each write, but
such heavy-handed approaches result in high overheads. Some prior solutions mitigate these high overheads by assuming the presence of modifed processors [62, 64],
while others require extensive program modifcations.

46

1

/ / L is a persistent l i s t

2

readFromNVM(&L ) ;

3

...

4

/ / Add element t o t h e t a i l o f l i s t

5

pthread_lock (&m) ;

6

e = nvmalloc ( s i z e o f ( elem ) , ’ e ’ ) ;

7

e−>v a l = l o c a l V a l ;

8

t a i l −>n e x t = e ;

9

e−>prev = t a i l ;

10

tail = e;

11

pthread_unlock (&m)

Figure 3.1.: Pseudo-code that appends to a persistent list.

3.3 Related Work
Persistent programming models. BPFS [64] and PMFS [67] are example flesystems that leverage the low latency of NVM to accelerate flesystem operations. BPFS
uses optimized shadow copying to maintain consistency, but requires new hardware
primitives in the form of epoch barriers. These systems do not require any application
changes, but restrict applications to the block based fle system interface.
Mnemosyne [63] and NV-Heaps [62] expose direct NVM access but require applications to be rewritten with transactions. NV-Heaps relies on processor changes and
maintains undo logs. NVthreads has similar goals as these systems, but uses multiprocess execution, and does not require applications to use transactions. Mnemosyne
extends software transactional memory with durability semantics and, similar to
NVthreads, uses redo logs. However, our evaluation shows that NVthreads outperforms Mnemosyne by 2-10× because of its design choices and use of operating system
techniques.
Prior work on Java concurrency control has shown how transactional boundaries
can be inferred from locks [68]. Atlas extends this idea to add durability semantics
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Issue

Commonly used solu-

NVthreads approach

NVthreads advantage

Infer from synchroniza-

Ease of programming

tions
Determine

consistency

Use

durable

transac-

points

tions [62, 63]

tion points

Handle transaction aborts

Use undo logs [61, 71],

Use process memory, no

Lower overheads, simpler

word level STM [63]

undo logs

recovery

Handle in-fight updates

Use redo logs

Use redo logs

None

Track updates

Intercept each store [61]

Intercept page writes

Amortized

or word [63]
Volatile caches

costs,

good

performance

Flush writes, some require

Flush log entries (memory

Amortized costs, no pro-

new hardware [62, 64, 69]

pages)

cessor changes

Table 3.1.: NVthreads design decisions.

to lock-based programs [61]. Atlas provides a compiler and runtime that instruments
writes to NVM and creates an undo log for each store to aid recovery. JUSTDO logging improves performance and log management in Atlas like systems by storing the
program counter and resuming execution of critical sections from exactly the same
point where a crash occurred [69]. JUSTDO logging assumes caches are persistent,
and has severe programming model restrictions such as volatile data cannot be used
inside critical sections and compiler optimizations like register promotion have to be
disabled. In fact, JUSTDO logging is 2-3× slower than Atlas on systems with volatile
caches, which is the environment that NVthreads targets. Although NVthreads and
Atlas both infer failure atomic regions from critical sections, NVthreads’ approach
is very di˙erent. NVthreads tracks data modifcations at the granularity of virtual
memory pages, isolates thread execution via forking processes, and uses redo logs instead of undo logs. Our evaluation shows that Atlas incurs high overheads of fushing
data, and NVthreads outperforms Atlas by 2× on many applications. SoftWrAP uses
cache-line combine of writes and asynchronous writes to logs to improve application
performance [70]. Unlike SoftWrAP, NVthreads automatically infers failure atomic
sections, uses operating system techniques to track updates, and is easy to integrate
with pthreads based applications.
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Table 3.1 summarizes the benefts of NVthreads’ design decisions over existing
persistent programming systems.
Operating system mechanisms. NVthreads’ use of page-level tracking to provide
crash tolerance is similar to RVM [72] and Rio-Vista [73]. Unlike RVM, NVthreads
does not have the limitation that data needs to ft in memory, nor does it require
DRAM to be battery backed as in Rio-Vista. Additionally, RVM and Rio-Vista
don’t infer consistency semantics from synchronization operations. QuickStore [74]
and Texas [75] use virtual memory techniques to provide persistent object stores on
disks, but are more appropriate for object oriented programs. DThreads [76] and
Determinator [77] are systems that use multi-process execution to isolate threads
for deterministic execution. NVthreads uses the DThreads library to manage data
modifcations in critical sections, but removes the approach of a global token that
DThreads uses for deterministic execution, which can result in up to 9× application
slowdown. NVthreads uses a per-mutex token mechanism that improves concurrency
in some applications. Unlike DThreads, NVthreads also includes mechanisms to track
dependence between critical sections, manage redo logs, and recover from crashes.
Whole system persistence advocates the use of residual power supply energy to
fush data during a failure [78]. It relies on new hardware to provide the fush on
failure feature, and its software for saving data during failure is susceptible to operating system crashes. Other transparent checkpoint-restore mechanisms rely on
virtualization, which increases overheads for all applications or doesn’t determine
when checkpointing should occur so that data structures are consistent even in the
presence of multi-threading [79–81].
Databases and transactions. Most databases use ARIES [71] write-ahead logging
which was created to handle the performance di˙erence between sequential and random disk accesses. MARS uses editable atomic writes to make NVM-specifc choices
such as eliminating undo logs [82]. Stasis also uses write-ahead logging and LSN-free
pages to build durable data structures [83]. Similar to MARS, NVthreads does not
need an undo log but it is because NVthreads bu˙ers updates in process memory.
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3.4 Programming Model
NVthreads adds durability semantics to existing multithreaded programs. We
assume that both DRAM and NVM devices exist. NVM devices can be accessed by
memory instructions as well as traditional flesystem interfaces. We consider processor
caches to be volatile. Programs may control ordering of writes to NVM by using a
combination of cache fush instructions, such as clfush or the upcoming optimized
clfushopt, fences, and the pcommit instruction. We defne crashes to be failures that

result in the loss of all processor and DRAM state, but do not corrupt NVM state.
Crashes can be caused by power failures or fail-stop software faults.
Original applications use locking primitives and multi-thread functionality provided by the pthreads programming model and library. Applications that link to the
new NVthreads library become crash tolerant, and may need to incorporate recovery
code to resume execution. We assume that programs modify shared persistent data
within critical sections that demarcate failure atomic regions. Program data structures may be inconsistent within a critical section, but data structures are always
consistent outside critical sections (when no locks are held).
NVthreads works as follows: it (1) uses critical sections to determine failure atomic
regions, (2) tracks dependence between failure atomic regions to decide when to make
logs permanent, (3) uses redo logs to ensure NVM data is consistent after a crash, and
(4) runs the optional application specifc recovery code before resuming execution.
Guarantee. NVthreads guarantees that in the event of a crash failure, and after the
completion of NVthreads’ recovery process, application data structures will be in a
consistent state in NVM, i.e., the program state after recovery is as if the program
stopped when no locks were held, and the implementation guarantees it by providing
the appearance of stopping at the exit of a critical section.
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3.4.1 Persistent Regions
A persistent region is a segment of memory, such as a memory mapped fle, which
is backed by non-volatile memory. NVthreads uses persistent regions to store application data durably. Data structures stored in persistent regions survive application
crashes due to faults or power loss. Applications can allocate memory from persistent
regions via nvmalloc, a persistent memory allocator. When allocating persistent objects, applications can install a handle, such as a variable name, that acts as an entry
point to the object. After a crash, the recovery program may use the handle to determine the location of the persistent object and to traverse other reachable objects.
For example, the recovery program may start from the head of a list, and traverse it
to fnd elements in the linked list. Data not in persistent regions, such as application
data in DRAM, are lost when a program terminates correctly or incorrectly, or if the
system crashes. Applications can continue to allocate and access volatile memory
using existing interfaces such as malloc.

3.4.2 Inferring Consistent Program Points
A key challenge in adding durability semantics to programs is to determine when
data structures are consistent. Instead of using durable transactions and rewriting
applications, NVthreads infers failure atomic regions from synchronization primitives.
NVthreads’ API also supports programmers who explicitly specify commit points,
similar to manual checkpointing. However, this work focuses on how NVthreads can
automatically infer failure atomic regions, thus making it easier for programmers to
add durability semantics to their programs.
Multithreaded applications use synchronization primitives, such as locks, to safely
modify shared data structures. NVthreads uses these synchronization points as the
boundary for failure atomic regions. We assume that programs are data race-free
and data structures are consistent at synchronization points. However, updates inside critical sections can leave data structures inconsistent due to an untimely crash.
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NVthreads uses two rules to guarantee that data structures in persistent memory are
always consistent: (1) if an application crashes while a thread is in a critical section,
NVthreads ensures that updates to persistent data in the critical section are not visible in NVM, and (2) if an application crashes when a thread is outside of a critical
section, NVthreads guarantees that only modifcations till the last successfully executed critical section are made visible to NVM. The challenge for NVthreads is to
ensure that these rules hold true even in the presence of multi-threading and volatile
caches.
Returning to the example in Figure 3.1, if the program crashes at line 9, then the
last element in the list will not have a back-pointer and the variable tail will no longer
point to the last element. NVthreads avoids leaving the list in such an inconsistent
state by making the critical section failure atomic. Let’s assume that there are two
threads T1 and T2 executing the critical section to append elements to the list. If
T1 has successfully completed the critical section and T2 crashes in the middle of

executing the critical section, then NVthreads will ensure that the persistent list,
after program recovery, has only one new element.
Dependent critical sections. Locks lead to multiple kinds of critical sections.
There may be cases with (1) an inner critical section completely surrounded by the
outer critical section (perfect nesting), (2) two critical sections that overlap, such as
lock chaining [84], or (3) critical sections that use condition variables. In all these
cases, additional care is taken by NVthreads to ensure data structure consistency.
Figure 3.2 shows two examples of nested critical sections, one with perfect nesting
and another with overlapping critical sections. Note that the case where critical
sections don’t nest perfectly does not arise in programs with transactions because
transactions are scoped regions without partial overlap [62, 63]. NVthreads treats
nested critical sections as a single failure atomic region. Logically, the system provides
atomic durability to the smallest program region that encompasses all lock acquires
and releases in a particular nested critical section. In Figure 3.2, NVthreads will
guarantee that lines 2-7 (and 9-14) are atomically durable. For example, if a crash
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1
2

/ / Well nested s e c t i o n
pthread_lock (&m1) ;

8
9

/ / Lock c h a i n i n g
pthread_lock (&m1) ;

3

pthread_lock (&m2) ;

10

pthread_lock (&m2) ;

4

...

11

...

5

pthread_unlock (&m2) ;

12

6

...

13

...

14

pthread_unlock (&m2) ;

7

pthread_unlock (&m1) ;

pthread_unlock (&m1) ;

Figure 3.2.: Di˙erent types of nested critical sections.

1

/ / Thread T1

1

2

a = 0;

2

3

pthread_lock (&m1) ;

3

4

pthread_lock (&m2) ;

/ / Thread T2

4

...

5

a = 42;

5

b = 0;

6

pthread_wait (& cv , &m2) ;

6

pthread_lock (&m2) ;

7

...

7

b = a;
pthread_signal (& cv ) ;

8

pthread_unlock (&m2) ;

8

9

/ / crash

9

10

pthread_unlock (&m1) ;

10

pthread_unlock (&m2) ;
...

Figure 3.3.: Dependence between nested critical sections.

occurs in line 6 then changes made even in the internal critical section (lines 3-5) are undone. NVthreads tracks dependence between nested critical sections to
correctly refect updates in NVM. For example, the inner critical section in lines 3-5
is dependent on the outer critical section, and should become durable only after line
7 successfully completes.
Figure 3.3 shows another example of why NVthreads tracks dependence between
nested critical sections. Line 3-10 in T1 has nested locks and a condition variable,
but it is a single failure atomic region, i.e., even if a crash occurs at line 9 the value
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of a should be 0 after recovery. However, in this example T2 will set b to 42 (line 7
under T2) before the crash occurs. After recovery, this will lead to an inconsistent
state where a is 0 but b is 42. NVthreads ensures that such cases do not arise by
tracking dependence between critical sections. In this example, the critical section
in T2 is dependent on T1, and the changes in T2 will not be visible in NVM unless
T1 completes the nested critical section. Section 3.5.1 describes how NVthreads

implements dependence tracking.

3.4.3 Recovery Code
In the event of a crash, NVthreads guarantees that program data structures are
durable in NVM up to the point of the last successfully completed critical section.
The recovery component consists of two parts. First, applications invoke NVthreads’
recovery function, nvrecover, to apply log entries to NVM-resident data. This component is application agnostic. Second, similar to other systems, programmers may need
to write application specifc recovery code to resume execution after a crash [61, 63].
The user-provided recovery code is primarily used to assign NVM data to program
variables, such as reading back two separately allocated arrays that are felds of a
single variable, and assigning them to the appropriate felds.
While the amount of user-provided recovery code depends upon the complexity of
an application, most programs simply need to call the application agnostic nvrecover
for each allocated data and assign the output to program variables. In our experience,
the recovery code for many machine learning and graph algorithms is only a few
lines that read core data structures from NVM and restart iterations to run until
convergence (Figure 3.4).

3.4.4 Garbage Collection
Due to crashes, applications using non-volatile memory have to handle cases of
persistent memory leaks and dangling pointers. As an example, if a persistent object
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1

/ * p o i n t s : i n p u t 2D p o i n t s

2

labels [ i ] : id of center closest to point i

3

Only ‘ l a b e l s ’ i s p e r s i s t e n t

*/

4

/ / Main i t e r a t i o n s

5

f l o a t * kmeans ( f l o a t * p o i n t s , f l o a t * l a b e l s ) {

6

centers = calculateCenters ( labels ) ;

7

while ( ! converged ) {

8

pthread_create ( . . , f i n d D i s t a n c e , . . ) ;

9

pthread_join ( . . ) ;

10

c e n t e r s = updateCenters ( l a b e l s ) ;

11

}

12

return centers ; }

13

/ / C a l c u l a t e d i s t a n c e f o r subset o f p o i n t s

14

void f i n d D i s t a n c e ( p o i n t s , l a b e l s , c e n t e r s ) {

15

/ / f i n d closest center f o r points with id in [X,Y]

16

pthread_lock (&m_xy ) ;

17

labels [X:Y] = closestCenters [ . . ] ;

18

pthread_unlock (&m_xy ) ;

19

...

20

}

21

/ / Recovery code

22

void main ( ) {

23

i f ( crashed ( ) )

24

nvrecover ( l a b e l s , N * 2 * s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) , ’ l a b e l s ’ ) ;

25

else

26

l a b e l s =( f l o a t * ) nvmalloc (N * s i z e o f ( f l o a t ) , ’ l a b e l s ’ ) ;

27

...

28
29

ans = kmeans ( p o i n t s , l a b e l s ) ;
}

Figure 3.4.: Pseudo-code for multithreaded K-means.
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stores a pointer to volatile memory then after a crash it will point to garbage since
volatile contents are lost. Such programs are discouraged, but NVthreads currently
does not enforce these pointer restrictions. Similarly, after recovery if programs do not
reuse persistent data that they store, the memory space will be wastage. NVthreads
assumes that a garbage collector exists for the persistent regions (similar to fle system
checkers). This garbage collector should run after a crash, collecting unreachable
memory, and fagging dangling pointers.

3.4.5 Example: K-means Clustering
Iterative machine learning algorithms, such as clustering on large datasets, can
take hours to converge even with multiple CPU cores (Section 3.6.4). Therefore, after
a crash it is benefcial to restart the program from the last completed iteration instead
of the beginning. Figure 3.4 is an implementation of K-means algorithm that becomes
crash tolerant when linked with NVthreads. K-means is a clustering technique that
divides the input dataset (stored in the array points) into K groups. The algorithm
proceeds in rounds, refning the centers until convergence. In an iteration, each point
is frst assigned to the closest center (stored in the array labels), and then centers are
updated by taking the average of points assigned to them.
In lines 5-12 the centers are frst initialized using the current labels. In each
iteration threads calculate the closest center to a subset of points, and update the
corresponding labels in a critical section (lines 16-18). When a thread exits the
critical section NVthreads guarantees that the labels of all the points it was working
on have been updated. Lines 23-24 depict the recovery code. After a crash, the
program re-reads labels from NVM. Otherwise, it allocates memory in NVM to store
the labels. The real recovery work is performed by the nvrecover function which is
application agnostic and implemented in the NVthreads runtime. After a crash, the
K-means algorithm will simply restart its execution by calculating the latest centers
from labels.
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Algorithm 1 Execution fow for each thread T
1: while T has not terminated do
2:

wT ← ∅

3:

while instruction i is not a synchronization event do

4:
5:

. Initialize write set

if i is a memory store then
wT ← wT ∪ {page with memory address}

6:

end if

7:

Run i on priv. copy of global state

8:

end while

9:

log(wT )

10:

Merge di˙ of pages from private copy to global state

11:

Execute synchronization event

. Avoids fne-grained logs

. Log di˙ of modifed pages

12: end while

3.5 Design and Implementation
Algorithm 1 shows how NVthreads implements its persistent programming model.
As each thread executes, the write set tracks updates, which are initially performed
on a process private copy of data. At synchronization points, modifed data is frst
logged and then merged with the global state. For simplicity we have not shown the
dependence tracking for nested critical sections.
An important challenge is to implement Algorithm 1 while ensuring good application performance. Unlike prior solutions, NVthreads uses operating system techniques
to reduce application overheads. It leverages DThreads’ approach [76] to execute a
multithreaded program as a multi-process program, though reducing the overheads
imposed by deterministic execution. NVthreads also tracks dependence between critical sections, creates redo logs, and fushes log entries to NVM for recovery.

3.5.1 From Threads to Processes
NVthreads converts threads into child processes that execute in isolation until a
synchronization point is reached. Typical synchronization points are lock acquires
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and releases, as well as thread creation and exit. At a synchronization point, changes
made by child processes are applied to the original shared pages and made visible
to all. This merge phase ensures that the behavior of the multi-process execution
corresponds to a valid multithreaded execution: threads can access and modify shared
data.
Tokens. Since multithreaded programs running under NVthreads become multiprocess, we use the term token to denote mutexes visible across processes. Figure 3.5
shows an example of how execution proceeds in NVthreads. We assume that the
application has two threads (T1 and T2 ) that become processes when executing under
NVthreads. This process-based isolation is used to bu˙er uncommitted writes. Outside the critical sections, processes execute in parallel. Inside a critical section, such
as a locked region, processes execute sequentially, i.e., one after the other. Sequential
execution is enforced by making each process wait for a per-lock token. This per-lock
token is logically similar to a mutex in a multithreaded program, except that it is visible across processes using shared memory. Only the process that acquires the token
can enter the corresponding critical section. Others wait till the token is released.
Once a process exits the critical section it writes its dirty pages to the log and fushes
the log to NVM for durability. It then merges its modifcations to the shared state,
which makes the local updates visible to everyone, and fnally passes the token to the
next waiting process. It is worthwhile to point out that DThreads uses a single perprogram global token to ensure there is a deterministic order of thread interleaving.
This global token reduces concurrency: it serializes even those threads that access
completely di˙erent mutexes. For deterministic ordering among threads, DThreads
also forces all threads to wait at a barrier each time a mutex is released. This barrier
can result in poor performance if there is load imbalance among threads. NVthreads
reduces the overheads in some applications by admitting more thread interleavings
(Section 3.6.2).
Copy-on-write. Child processes in NVthreads are created using the clone system
call and each process gets a copy-on-write version of the program data. Shared mem-
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Figure 3.5.: Overview of thread execution in NVthreads.

ory regions are backed by a fle, which is mapped into each process’ address space and
updated at synchronization points. Specifcally, each process has two references of
program memory: shared and process-local, which are created through two di˙erent
mmap calls to the same fle. Pages are initially read-only outside the critical sec-

tion. Once processes write to pages, NVthreads’ page fault handler uses mprotect on
process-local pages with PROT_READ or PROT_WRITE and MAP_PRIVATE
fags, e˙ectively creating a copy-on-write page for local modifcations. During the
merge phase, the runtime compares dirty pages from a child process with the original
versions of the shared pages, and applies the bytes modifed by the child to the shared
state. Only the dirty private bytes (i.e., di˙s) are applied to the shared pages at synchronization points. At the end of a critical section, NVthreads releases the private
copies and redirects references of these addresses to the shared pages with read-only
permission set.
Dependent critical sections. The NVthreads runtime tracks dependence between
durable regions to correctly handle nested critical sections and condition variables.
NVthreads bu˙ers the generated logs till all threads that are dependent on each other
exit their critical section. Figure 3.6 shows how NVthreads tracks this dependence.
If a thread T1 is inside a nested critical section, and passes a token to thread T2 for
execution, then T2 is dependent on T1 if T2 touches a page that T1 modifed in the
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current nested section. Only when T1 completely exits its nested critical region are
the logs of T1 and T2 together committed to NVM. In Figure 3.6, logs 1, 2, and 3 are
written to NVM only when T1 unlocks m1.

3.5.2 Logging
Figure 3.7 illustrates how logging works in NVthreads. Since NVthreads uses
multi-process execution, data structure modifcations are initially available only in
the private copy used by each process. Only at synchronization points, and after dirty
pages have been merged with the shared program state, will the changes be potentially
refected in NVM (depending upon when cache lines are evicted). NVthreads requires
only logs to be durably fushed from caches to non-volatile memory. Except for the
log truncation operation, which we describe later, NVthreads’ correctness guarantees
do not depend upon when application data is fushed from caches, which reduces the
overhead of eagerly fushing cache lines.
Ordered writes to NVM. Since NVM devices appear as memory, the processor
may cache data and reorder updates. NVthreads has to ensure that applications
can correctly recover even in the presence of volatile caches and re-ordered writes.
NVthreads requires two mechanisms from the hardware, which are available in most
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processors, and are also expected to be present in NVM systems. First, NVthreads
requires a way to evict cache lines to NVM, such as the clfush or clfushopt instruction.
NVthreads uses these calls to keep its log consistent and durable. Second, NVthreads
assumes that the system provides fences, such as mfence, to ensure that instructions
prior to a fence complete before those after the fence. Applications should also be
able to use operating system functionality, such as msync or fdatasync, to write out
logs to NVM. The fdatasync call, when used as a blocking call, ensures that all writes
have safely reached the device before returning.
Coarse-grained memory management. Figure 3.8 contrasts fne-grained memory
management [61, 63] with NVthreads. In fne-grained memory management, frst
each NVM write has to be intercepted in software, then log entries are made durable
followed by program data. The sync operator ensures writes reach the NVM and are
ordered. It involves draining the volatile cache line using clfush followed by a barrier
for instruction ordering. In contrast, NVthreads uses process local pages to bu˙er
writes, and at the end of the critical section, logs modifed pages. This approach
allows NVthreads to avoid intercepting each NVM write. Additionally, only writes to
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Figure 3.8.: Fine-grained [61] vs coarse-grained tracking.

the log need to reliably reach the NVM. The log provides the opportunity to batch
pages and use the unordered but faster clfushopt instruction instead of clfush.
Redo log. NVthreads uses a redo log for crash recovery. Data structure modifcations
are frst committed to the log and then made durable in the application’s working
space (Figure 3.7). NVthreads uses the mprotect system call and a custom page fault
handler to track dirty pages. Right before dirty pages of a process are merged with
the shared program state, the dirty portions of the pages (i.e., di˙s) are written out to
the log. For correctness, the log has to be made durable before merging changes with
shared program state. Otherwise, application data may reach the NVM before the log,
and a crash in between will result in a case where the system cannot undo inconsistent
data structures in NVM. NVthreads uses fdatasync to write out log entries to NVM.
After writing out the log entry, NVthreads also writes out a special end-of-log symbol.
This symbol is used during recovery to identify if all of the items in a log append
were written to NVM. The end-of-log symbol is durably written before the current
process continues to merge its dirty pages to the shared program state.
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Unlike the log, NVthreads does not force application data to be fushed from
volatile caches after each merge phase, thus reducing cache fush overheads. The
reason is because the log has suÿcient information to recover data in the case of a
crash. This approach of not forcing data out to durable media is similar to ARIES
like protocols, i.e. no-force in database parlance [71].
No undo log. NVthreads does not create undo logs. In the ARIES style of database
logging, the modifed data of in-fight transactions may be paged out to the disk to
make space in the bu˙er manager. In Atlas [61] updates are made in-place. Therefore,
these systems need an undo log to remove the e˙ects of uncommitted transactions
or durable sections. In NVthreads each process makes its modifcations on a private
copy-on-write version of data, and the undo log is unnecessary.
Log truncation. Since reapplying the log from the beginning can be slow, NVthreads
supports log truncation to reduce the number of log entries that need to be replayed
during recovery. The redo log can be truncated up to a particular entry if the system
can guarantee that all changes up to that entry are refected in NVM. Since the
application writes its data directly to NVM, the only issue is to ensure that data
in the volatile caches makes it to NVM before the corresponding write entries in
the log are truncated. In NVthreads, log truncation is triggered periodically in the
merge phase of the synchronization points, when NVthreads has control over the
whole program, and the application is quiescent. NVthreads frst fushes all cache
entries, and then truncates the log, using a fence to order the cache fush before log
truncation.

3.5.3 Recovery
Applications initiate the recovery process if they are re-starting after a crash.
NVthreads logs the modifed portion of each page, i.e., the di˙, before they are
applied to the shared state at a synchronization point. During recovery, all the log
entries are applied to recreate application data pages.
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Applications invoke nvrecover, the NVthreads recovery function, which frst replays the redo log, applying entries in the log to corresponding pages in the NVM
(Figure 3.4). Once the recovery process is complete, it is guaranteed that the application’s data structures in the NVM are consistent as of the last completed critical
section. Some applications may have additional user written recovery code to read
data structures from the NVM, assign them to program variables, and resume execution.

3.6 Evaluation
We evaluate NVthreads to answer the following: (1) What are the overheads of
making programs durable? (2) What are the benefts of NVM over fash storage? (3)
How important is fast recovery? and (4) How does NVthreads compare to Mnemosyne
and Atlas?

3.6.1 Setup
All experiments were run on a Ubuntu 14.04 (Linux 3.16.7) server with two Intel
Xeon X5650 processors (12 cores@2.67 GHz), 198GB RAM, and 600GB SSD.
Applications.

We used 14 multithreaded benchmarks from PARSEC [49] and

Phoenix [65], and ran them with the confguration of a large dataset. We also use
PageRank, a graph algorithm, and K-means clustering.
NVM emulator. Since NVM devices are commercially unavailable, we use a simple emulator to measure the e˙ect of di˙erent NVM latencies on performance. As
NVthreads relies on a NVM flesystem to store its log, the emulator consists of a modifed Linux tmpfs on DRAM in which software delays are injected to each read and
write flesystem call. These delays are created by reading the processor timestamp via
RDTSCP instruction and spinning in a loop until the counter reaches a certain value.

In all experiments, we add 1,000ns delay to each 4KB page write, which models the
expected overhead for write barriers and cache fushes with clfushopt [67].

Runtime overhead
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3.6.2 Performance
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 shows the overheads of using NVthreads on all 14
applications from the Phoenix and PARSEC benchmarks. Instead of modifying the
applications to call nvmalloc and persist only a selective set of data structures, we
made all heap allocated data persistent by ensuring each call to malloc is a persistent
allocation. This setup ensures that we are measuring the worst case overhead, i.e.,
when all data is durable, without modifying the application at all. We did not add
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restart code to applications for this experiment since the goal is to observe overheads
during normal execution.
In Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 each program uses twelve threads. The baseline
is programs running in DRAM with pthreads. The DThreads performance numbers
give a sense of the overheads of converting multithreaded execution into multi-process
execution. NVthreads numbers are on the modifed tmpfs with a 1,000ns delay to each
page write. We also show the performance of these applications when made durable
using Atlas, which uses fne-grained cache line fush based logging.
Our results show that for 9 out of 14 applications, NVthreads makes the application durable with less than 28% overhead. Only reverse index, canneal, ferret,
and dedup have more than 4× overhead compared to unmodifed applications using pthreads. The DThreads bars in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 show that these
programs incur considerable overhead when using multi-process execution. However,
NVthreads’ can improve concurrency in some applications where DThreads would
have serialized thread execution due to the global token. As an example, even though
canneal with NVthreads is 4× slower than the pthreads version, it is actually 2×

faster than the non-persistent DThreads version. Similarly, reverse index would have
been 7× slower, instead of 5.5×, if the global token approach was used. ferret and
dedup use the global token version of NVthreads, and we expect their overheads to

decrease with the per-mutex token version of NVthreads.
Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 shows that NVthreads performs as well, and in most
cases signifcantly better, than Atlas. We were not able to get Atlas to run on the
two challenging workloads of canneal and dedup in the PARSEC benchmark. In 10
out of the 12 workloads on which Atlas ran, NVthreads is from 7% to 100× faster
depending upon the workload. NVthreads is about 7% and 50% slower than Atlas for
streamcluster and reverse index respectively. In reverse index, most of the overheads

in NVthreads are due to the multi-process execution as shown by the DThreads bar.
Section 3.6.5 has more in-depth comparison with Atlas.
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Table 3.2.: Application characteristics of PARSEC and Phoenix.
Program

Slowdown
Critical sections

Logging (%tot. time)

Logged pages

Log size
over pthread

histogram
kmeans

25

12.56%

44

0.3MB

1.2

1845

20.91%

9763

46MB

1.5

linear reg.

25

12.87%

27

0.2MB

0.3

matrix mult.

37

2.32%

3955

16MB

1.1

pca

25

18.11%

11463

45MB

1.1

reverse index

137113

37.88%

2691474

11GB

5.5

string match

37

3.24%

39

0.3MB

1.1

word count

145

1.72%

12476

50MB

1.1

blackscholes

25

6.76%

89

39MB

1.2

1475

39.34%

7440183

29GB

4.1

320492

33.72%

2314600

11GB

6.7

8010

4.93%

149963

618MB

4.8

95581

47.07%

176054

1.1GB

3.7

25

4.76%

483

2.0MB

1.2

canneal
dedup
ferret
streamcluster
swaptions

Application characteristics. Table 3.2 shows the characteristics of all benchmarks
by measuring the number of critical section invocations and logging overheads. The
Phoenix benchmarks primarily include data mining applications. Except for reverse
index, NVthreads has to log only 27 to 12K dirty pages in Phoenix applications,

and results in only 20% slowdown over the pthreads version. In comparison, for
some of the PARSEC applications such as dedup, NVthreads has to manage and log
about 2.3 million dirty pages and spends 34% of the total time in logging. This high
logging overhead, in addition to multi-process execution, is a reason for dedup’s 6.7×
slowdown. The application linear regression has better performance than pthreads
because multi-process execution reduces false sharing.
Our experiments also reveal that NVthreads has low memory footprint and uses
at most 400MB more DRAM space versus the pthreads version.
Page-level tracking. Figure 3.11 shows what percentage of each page is modifed
by the application. It can help us understand whether page-based tracking is a good
option compared to byte level tracking. There are two interesting observations. First,
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Figure 3.11.: Average percentage of each 4KB page modifed by an application. Applications are ordered by total number of modifed pages, which is shown in brackets.

9 out of the 14 applications modify more than 55% of each page. This means if these
applications modify a page, they generally write more than 2KB of data to the page.
This makes it worthwhile to track data at the granularity of a page. Second, of
the 5 remaining applications that write only a few bytes per page, 4 of them (linear
regression, string match, histogram, and blackscholes) modify fewer than 90 pages

during the execution of the program. These applications have few overall writes and,
as shown in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10, they are less than 20% slower on NVM with
NVthreads than running with pthreads on DRAM.
Scalability. We also evaluated whether NVthreads programs scale similar to their
pthreads counterparts as core count increases from 1 to 12. As shown in Figure 3.12,

our results reveal that pthreads provides low to moderate speedup for the 14 applications, never reaching more than 6.5× speedup over a single core. When using
NVthreads 10 applications show similar scalability as with pthreads. Of the remaining four applications, ferret and dedup with NVthreads scale about 70% less than
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Figure 3.12.: Speedup compared to single core. Higher is better.

pthreads. In stream cluster, the pthreads version with 12 cores is 3× faster than

one core, but the NVthreads version is only 1.3× faster than single core. Finally, for
canneal, the pthreads version at 12 cores is merely 1.3× faster than one core, while

the NVthreads version does not scale at all. The low scalability of these 4 NVthreads
applications is because of the high synchronization costs and write counts (Table 3.2).

3.6.3 Benefts of Using NVM Versus SSDs
We measure the speedup of programs on NVM over the same programs using ext4
on a solid state drive (SSD) to store the logs. We vary the 4KB page write delay to
NVM from 200ns (DRAM-like) to 50µs (Flash-like).
Latency-sensitive applications. Figure 3.13 shows fve applications whose performance improves substantially with NVM: streamcluster, dedup, reverse index, canneal, and ferret. There are two interesting observations. First, these applications can

be 2× to 22× faster on NVM compared to using SSDs. For example, streamcluster is
22× faster on low-latency NVM than SSD. Second, performance of these applications
drop only if NVM page write latency is much more than 1µs. These applications
track and write many dirty pages, and will beneft from NVM hardware as long as
NVM devices are reasonably faster than SSDs.
Storage-agnostic applications. The remaining nine applications show little di˙erence as we vary NVM latency. Therefore, in Figure 3.13 we plot the performance of
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Figure 3.13.: E˙ect of NVM page write delay on application performance. Speedups
are over SSD. Higher is better.

only kmeans. These applications have around 15% performance beneft when using
NVM as compared to using an SSD. Note that these applications were anyway incurring a mere 28% overhead compared to their original pthreads versions. They depict a
spectrum of applications where NVthreads incurs very little logging overhead to add
durability, and we expect programmers to run them with NVthreads even on today’s
storage systems.
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3.6.4 Benefts of Recovery
Figure 3.14 shows the benefts of adding durability to programs. We ran K-means
and introduced a crash during its execution. The input data (1M, 20M, and 30M 3-D
points) have to be clustered into 1,000 groups. On our datasets, K-means converges
after approximately 155 iterations. We had to modify only 4 lines in the program,
which nvmalloc and nvrecover the labels array.
In Figure 3.14, the x-axis shows the iteration when the crash occurred. We plot
the speedup compared to K-means with pthreads, i.e., the program has to restart
from the beginning in the event of a crash. Under these circumstances the maximum
possible speedup via recovery on any program is 2×, which happens when the program
crashes just before completion, thereby requiring everything to be redone. Figure 3.14
shows that for large inputs, if the crash occurs after 75 iterations, NVthreads’ version
of K-means converges almost 1.4× to 1.9× faster than starting from the beginning.
As an example, for the 30M dataset, the NVthreads version converges 30 minutes
earlier than the pthreads version. If the crash occurs too early in the computation,
very little work is wasted, and recovery does not provide much beneft. For the small
1M dataset, although the time to converge is only a couple of minutes, NVthreads
recovery is still useful if the crash occurs around iteration 150.

3.6.5 Mnemosyne and Atlas
We compare NVthreads with Mnemosyne [63] and Atlas [61] that use word or
store level data tracking. We limit our evaluation to microbenchmarks and a real-life
graph application because it was challenging to get Mnemosyne to work with other
benchmarks.
Microbenchmark. Mnemosyne crashes when we allocate more than 4MB of durable
data. Therefore, we use a microbenchmark that allocates 1000 memory pages (4MB
of data), and then 4 threads modify a random region of each page. In all cases,
threads modify di˙erent pages so that the STM in Mnemosyne does not incur any
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concurrency control related aborts. Mnemosyne incurs a constant overhead of 2
seconds when forking threads and using pmalloc. We have excluded this overhead for
Mnemosyne. Figure 3.15 shows the slowdown of each system compared to pthreads.
Both Mnemosyne and Atlas are 70× slower than pthreads in most cases and more than
200× slower when threads modify 100% of each page. NVthreads incurs an overhead
of 25× when only 5% of the data is modifed, which decreases to 5× when each
thread modifes 100% of each page. Since NVthreads tracks data at page granularity
its overheads get amortized as a bigger fraction of each page is modifed. As a
result, NVthreads is 3×-30× faster than these systems. The bar Atlas (no-clfush),
shows that half of Atlas’ overheads are due to cache fushes, which point to the
high overheads of micromanaging NVM writes. Finally, without any log truncation,
NVthreads uses 165MB to store metadata and logs, compared to 550MB-3.2GB by
Mnemosyne and 70MB-1.4GB for Atlas.
PageRank. The previous microbenchmark magnifes the overheads of durability
since the threads only perform persistent writes. Therefore, we also compare these
systems on a real application, PageRank, which is an iterative algorithm to determine
the importance of nodes in a Web graph [85]. First, we use the real-world Slashdot
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graph dataset which has 82K vertices and 950K edges [86]. We picked this graph
because it is the largest input on which we could run Mnemosyne. Even on this small
graph, NVthreads is more than 2× faster than Atlas and 10× faster than Mnemosyne
at 12 cores, completing an iteration in 170ms compared to 500ms for Atlas and 5
seconds for Mnemosyne. After 10 iterations, NVthreads needs only 273MB space for
logs compared to 580MB for Mnemosyne and 600MB for Atlas.
Unlike Mnemosyne, we were able to run NVthreads and Atlas on much larger
graphs such as the 1.2 GB Livejournal data [87]. NVthreads completes each PageRank
iteration in 5s with twelve threads and is almost 6× faster than Atlas which takes
29s. The pthreads version takes less than a second per iteration. NVthreads uses
300MB of log space per-iteration versus Atlas’ 650MB.

3.6.6 Key-value Store
Tokyo Cabinet is an high performance, open source library for database management [88]. It stores records as key value pairs. We confgured Tokyo Cabinet to
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organize its records using a B+ tree. Tokyo Cabinet uses a memory mapped fle to
back data and periodically fushes data using msync to guarantee durability.
Our goal is to make the B+ tree in Tokyo Cabinet durable by linking it with
NVthreads. Since Tokyo Cabinet and NVthreads both use page-based writes, we
expect unmodifed Tokyo Cabinet to have better performance since it uses custom
code to implement transations for key-value stores. This experiment shows that
NVthreads can be integrated without making any changes to the B+ tree. NVthreads
incurs higher overheads but avoids the code complexity of a custom transaction sytem.
In Figure 3.16 we compare Tokyo Cabinet running on (1) an SSD (TC-SSD), (2)
on our NVM emulator with injected delays (TC-nvmfs), and (3) when NVthreads is
used to make the B+ tree durable on the NVM emulator (TC-NVthreads). In our
workload we vary the key and value sizes from 64B to 4096B. We use 8 threads and
perform 100,000 write operations. Figure 3.16 shows that when Tokyo Cabinet is
used with an SSD (TC-SSD), its throughput varies from 1,300 updates/sec with 64B
keys to 1,200 updates/sec with 4096B keys. When we use NVthreads to make the
B+ tree in Tokyo Cabinet durable, its throughput on the NVM emulator ranges from
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12,000 updates/sec for 64B keys to 5,000 updates/sec for 4096B keys, which is 4×-9× better than using unmodifed Tokyo Cabinet on SSDs. Tokyo Cabinet running
on our NVM emulator achieves about 20,000 updates/sec with 64B keys and 7,500
updates/sec with 4096B keys. These numbers are about 30%-50% better than what
one gets when using NVthreads. Even though the performance when using NVthreads
is lower, it provides us an easy way to make the B+ tree durable by merely linking
with NVthreads and without developing a custom key-value transaction system.

3.7 Conclusion
NVthreads uses fast non-volatile memory to make C/C++ programs fault tolerant. It leverages synchronization operations to determine consistency semantics,
and coarse-grained page-level tracking to manage durable data. Due to these techniques, NVthreads has good performance. Compared to state-of-the-art persistent
systems, NVthreads signifcantly reduces the performance gap between unmodifed
applications and their crash tolerant versions.
While NVthreads advocates ease of use and the approach of coarse grained tracking, it has certain limitations. NVthreads piggybacks on synchronization primitives
to demarcate failure atomic sections. Other explicit or hybrid approaches for detecting failure atomic sections will make the programming model more general. We
expect NVthreads to co-exist with systems that embrace fne-grained tracking and
logging. NVthreads may perform better on workloads with large amounts of writes
in a page, but for certain workloads fne-grained tracking systems may be the appropriate implementation. There are multiple ways to improve our current prototype
as well, by adding a memory manager to clean up memory leaks in persistent regions, and by using a combination of regular and huge pages to reduce new overheads
seen in in-memory applications [89]. Overall, given the familiar interface of a multithreading library, we believe NVthreads is a design point which makes it simpler for
programmers to transition to the non-volatile memory era.

75

4 MEMORY SUBSYSTEM FOR SCALABILITY
This chapter presents a novel memory subsystem for memory-centric applications
to freely access memory beyond the traditional process boundary with support for
isolation and crash recovery. Our evaluation shows that the memory subsystem can
signifcantly outperform the traditional process-centric memory architecture when
accessing memory in multiple address spaces.

4.1 Overview
In response to the continuous demand for the ability to process ever larger datasets,
as well as based on discoveries in memristor [1] and phase-change memory [90] technologies, researchers have been vigorously studying memory-driven computing architectures [91, 92] that shall allow data-intensive applications to access enormous
amounts of non-volatile main memory. It is expected that by 2020 memory-centric
computing systems will process vast amounts of data generated by billions of interconnected devices worldwide [93]. These enterprise NVM systems will run applications
requiring an unprecedented amount of memory, exceeding what traditional DRAMbased memory architectures can support.
Memory architectures. However, there does not exist a memory architecture
that allows applications to eÿciently yet safely and securely leverage large (amounts
of) memory. As a result, programming with large memory is prone to remain extremely challenging for data-intensive applications. To access large datasets on today’s process-centric architectures, programmers have to architect their big data applications using traditional low-level programming interfaces [94, 95] in a tedious and
error-prone manner: this includes memory management system calls (e.g., mmap,
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munmap) for extending memory space logically, fle system interface calls (e.g., open,
close) for swapping datasets larger than memory capacity, and multi-processing in-

terface calls (e.g., clone, fork) for managing multiple address spaces and achieving
memory isolation. We argue that data-intensive applications require a new memory
architecture without involving these traditional interfaces in order to enable memorycentric computing. More precisely, we posit that a memory architecture should provide two forms of decoupling:
Controlled space (de)coupling: In order to scale to large memory, the inherent coupling between a process and its address space has to be abandoned. Doing so
allows processes to be coupled with di˙erent memory spaces. Multi-processing
and parallelism require, inversely, the ability to couple a memory space with
more than one process, but security mandates fne-grained access control over
shared memory.
Robust time (de)coupling: As both processes and data can outlive each other, it is
important that couplings between processes and memory spaces can change over
time. With long-lived data, in particular when using large persistent memory
to replace external storage systems, it becomes of critical for performance to
avoid catastrophic data losses due to host failures.
Enter the AMS. In this chapter we thus propose PetaMem, a scalable fast memory architecture that enables applications to access memory beyond the traditional
process address space boundaries. PetaMem provides a novel abstraction called autonomous memory space (AMS) which achieves both controlled space (de)coupling
and robust time (de)coupling in an eÿcient manner. More precisely:
Large memory space (LMS) beyond terabytes abstracted conveniently allows for
separating processing units from data while avoiding expensive data movement
between main memory and back-end storage systems.
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Crash recovery (CR) is a key feature enabled by future NVM technologies that, in
combination with support for retaining consistency by precisely defning commit
points, can be leveraged by applications to safely recover data in the event of a
crash.
Memory isolation (MI) ensures that data stored in large memory that can potentially be accessed by many processes simultaneously or over time is e˙ectively
protected. Compartmentalizing memory with di˙erent privileges without expensive context switches enables big data applications to sandbox potentially
faulty or insecure software components eÿciently and securely.
Eÿciency (EF) is achieved in that applications can quickly switch between di˙erent
address spaces without involving all-level page table manipulation overheads,
expensive fle swapping operations, or costly process context switches.
Unifed programming interface (UPI) centered around the AMS abstraction allows programmers to handle data movement in large memory using simple and
pure memory instructions, as opposed to mixing fle system interfaces with
memory instructions in complex software.
Platform independence (PI) through a software-based memory architecture realizable on any operating system (OS) using page tables for logical address
translation allows next-generation data-intensive applications to be deployed
on commodity hardware (HW) in a timely manner.
We implemented a prototype of PetaMem on top of the Linux kernel with all
the above features. Our evaluation shows that PetaMem can outperform traditional
approaches by 500× when accessing large memory and provides up to 5,000× speedup
when recovering from failures.
Contributions. This chapter makes four contributions:
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- Design of PetaMem memory architecture that enables applications to eÿciently switch
between AMSes to access large memory without any HW modifcations.
- Specifcation of the PetaMem API for programmers to utilize the AMSes for fast
memory switching, resource isolation, and crash recovery.
- Implementation of PetaMem memory architecture that consists of a kernel-level memory management unit and a user space library that implements the PetaMem API.
- Evaluation of our PetaMem prototype showing that it outperforms traditional multiprocessing and low-level system calls when extending logical memory spaces, and
provides e˙ective recovery support after failures.

4.2 Background and Challenges
Memory management is one of the core duties of an OS. In this section we review
the challenges for accessing large memory and summarize related work that inspired
us to rethink memory management in large NVM systems.

4.2.1 Virtual Memory Size Limitation
Current 64-bit x86 systems follow the AMD64 extension to provide a 48-bit virtual,
and up to 52-bit physical, address space. The 48-bit canonical address design divides
the 64-bit virtual address space into higher and lower halves, thereby leaving an
unaddressable giant hole in the virtual address space. Since the design implies that a
process cannot address more than 48 bits of virtual memory, many vendors currently
do not manufacture CPUs that can address more than 48 bits (256TB) of main
memory. To echo the increasing demand for addressing large virtual main memory,
Intel proposed an architecture that employs a 5-level page table technique named
57-bit canonical address design [96] allowing 57-bit virtual, and up to 52-bit physical,
memory address space. Unfortunately, Intel’s proposed solution requires a completely
new page table entry (PTE) format in order to address 57 bits (128PB) of virtual

79
memory, which inevitably breaks the existing AMD64 architecture widely used by
modern systems. On today’s 64-bit AMD64 systems, the PTE format uses 40 bits to
address a physical page, with an addition of 12 bits from the linear address o˙set to
locate data within the page. As a result, even though Intel’s proposed 5-level page
table uses 57 bits to address virtual memory, the ability to address physical memory
is still limited to at most 52 bits (4PB). While today’s virtual memory size may seem
ample, big data applications already process data exceeding the virtual memory size
limitation [97] (LMS), leading data-intensive computing to use traditional techniques
for accessing large memory, discussed next.

4.2.2 Traditional Techniques and Issues
Researchers architect data-intensive applications to side-step the problem of insuÿcient virtual memory by using low-level memory management system calls (e.g.,
mmap, munmap), fle system interface calls (e.g., open, close), or multi-processing

interface calls (e.g., clone, fork) [94, 95].
To extend the logical address space of a process, mmap has been a popular choice
because of its simplicity (pure memory instructions) and performance (compared to
back-end storage swapping) [98]. Nevertheless, constantly changing the memory mappings of a process can be expensive as the kernel needs to establish and tear down
all level page tables and data pages for the mapped regions, hampering scalability
when the number or the size of memory mappings increases (EF). System V shared
memory region has the same scalability problem although it provides persistence.
Algorithms that randomly access data across mappings will scale poorly as only few
pages are accessed before the mapping is refreshed. File systems are another popular
option for accessing data beyond memory capacity [95]. However, in addition to the
programming burden caused by heterogeneous data formats (UPI), frequent swapping operations can impact the performance of applications, voiding the low latency
advantage provided by large memory (LMS). Finally, multi-processing is used by
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programmers to access large memory by partitioning large datasets into chunks and
processing the partitioned data into separate address spaces [94, 95, 99], despite the
well-known fact that the traditional process boundary makes sharing between address
spaces less fexible and more expensive than sharing data directly in memory (EF).
Another reason for using multi-processing is the lack of memory boundaries in multithreaded applications (MI). Many secure applications have been split into multiple
processes to achieve strong isolation [6,7]. As of today, no fexible sharing mechanism
exists that provides process-like isolation guarantees and thread-based memory sharing performance for applications to eÿciently and securely address multiple address
spaces.

4.2.3 Non-volatile Memory
Emerging non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies that promise very large memories are changing the existing design assumptions in system architectures [59]. NVM
technologies such as memristor [1] and phase-change memory [90] provide persistent
addressable memory at latency as low as DRAM devices [57], i.e., this type of memory
is byte addressable, mapped to a process’ address space, and persists across process
termination and reboots. With careful programming model support, NVM can allow applications to avoid the expensive de/serialization overheads (EF) and recover
program state after failures thus achieving crash fault tolerance (CR).

4.2.4 Related Work
Switching address spaces. Modern OSs widely employ the concept of virtual
memory to utilize RAM for all processes. Mach [100] manages the memory mappings for a process through machine-independent vm_objects. The physical pages in
a memory mapping are accessed by the kernel through the corresponding memory
object vm_object. With careful engineering e˙ort, such a design allows fast memory
mapping switching by changing the machine dependent vm_objects of a process with-
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out modifying the underlying page table entries. SpaceJMP [101] adopts the memory
management logic of Mach and promotes address spaces to frst-class citizens — virtual address spaces (VASs) — allowing threads to switch between virtual address
spaces. However, VASs do not support privilege isolation and crash recovery, both
being the requirements of a practical memory-driven architecture for data-intensive
computing. The design of SpaceJMP can be diÿcult to be realized in other kernels
without the notion of machine-independent memory objects that contains physical
pages or similar [102] (PI). On the contrary, PetaMem does not rely on any kernel
data structure assumptions but page tables, which are widely used by modern kernels,
in order to eÿciently support address spaces. In addition, PetaMem allows applications to defne fexible memory isolation policies (MI) and to recover from failures
when accessing multiple address spaces (CR).
System-level isolation. Switching between address spaces in the traditional processcentric architecture is a costly operation. The heavyweight process abstraction has led
researchers to search for lightweight memory isolation techniques. Recent softwarebased isolation systems such as Nooks [103], Wedge [8], Dune [16], Arbiter [10],
SMVs [3], LwCs [104], and seL4 [105] have all demonstrated the feasibility of compartmentalizing memory using fner granularities than a process address space (MI).
Other HW-based systems such as CODOMS [40] and CHERI [41] introduced bytelevel protection mechanism to isolate memory using specialized HW with capability support (PI). Inspired by the above secure systems, PetaMem’s isolation engine
makes PetaMem the frst memory architecture that allows fast address space switching (LMS) and memory isolation (MI) at the same time.
Crash recovery with NVM. Many systems have been proposed to access NVM
as main memory with careful programming model support, allowing applications to
avoid the overheads of marshaling data between fast memory and slow storage devices
and recover program state from crash failures (EF). Atlas [61] infers failure-atomic
code sections to automatically checkpoint execution state with compiler support.
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Mnemosyne [63] and NV-Heap [62] enable applications to execute durable transactions
but they do not support lock-based programs. NVthreads [56] adopts copy-on-write
and multi-processing to track data in NVM at page level granularity for performance.
Intel’s PMDK [92] provides a set of low-level persistent memory tools for programmers
to interact with NVM. All above systems can record the execution state of an NVM
program and allow for crash recovery (CR), but none were designed to address large
memories (LMS). On the other hand, PetaMem allows a program to access memory
across di˙erent address spaces eÿciently and enables a crashed NVM program to
resume its execution (CR). PetaMem assumes a system with a large main memory
pool without having to involve fle system interfaces when accessing NVM (UPI).
Accessing NVM through fle system APIs is an orthogonal problem that is explored
by others (e.g., PMFS [67], BPFS [64], SCMFS [106]).
Single address space OSs. Single address space OSs (SASOSs) [107] such as
Opal [108], Singularity [109], and unikernels [110] took an extreme approach to eliminate expensive full context switches by sharing a global virtual address space among
all processes running on a system. However, the ability to address large virtual memory in SASOSs is still restricted by the canonical address rule (i.e., limited virtual
address bits) when running on commodity HW (LMS). In addition, the lack of address
space boundary in SASOSs requires the OS kernel and all applications to be written
in a memory-safe language to ensure system security (MI). While researchers have
proposed an OS kernel written in a memory-safe language [111], in the near future, it
is unlikely that existing kernels and all legacy software would be completely rewritten in memory-safe languages for full memory safety [112]. In contrast, PetaMem
provides an eÿcient way for applications to switch between address spaces (LMS)
and isolate memory (MI) without completely rewriting the entire software stack, or
requiring specialized HW (PI).
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Figure 4.1.: The timeline of a PetaMem process. The PetaMem process memory
abstraction allows a process to switch between di˙erent autonomous memory spaces
(AMSes) that can exist in the system beyond the process lifetime. Note that AMS 2
contains two private domains with special privileges.

4.3 PetaMem Design
PetaMem is a software-backed memory architecture that enables applications to
access large memory through a novel address space abstraction. The abstraction
allows a process to switch between memory areas in a fast and secure way. This
section describes our architectural-level design and the corresponding programming
interface.
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4.3.1 Autonomous Memory Spaces
To enable a process to address more memory than what today’s ISAs (instruction set architectures) can support, we introduce a new memory abstraction called
autonomous memory space (AMS) that completely decouples the traditional process
address space from the process abstraction in the system (LMS), yet in a controlled
fashion (MI). An AMS is a special memory mapping with a contiguous range of memory addresses. Data stored in an AMS can be persisted in the system beyond the
lifetime of a process and allows for eÿcient data recovery. As shown in Figure 4.1,
PetaMem can dynamically couple an AMS with a process address space and decouple
an AMS from a process address space after use. PetaMem guarantees the consistent
state of other memory sections including the text, data, and stack in the process memory. PetaMem can keep the data stored in an AMS alive when a process decouples the
AMS from its address space. The AMS abstraction enables applications not only to
address large memory by switching between di˙erent AMSes, but also to checkpoint
or to version their execution states. A program can simply re-couple its address space
with an AMS from a checkpoint in the previous execution without having to redo all
the work from the beginning, thereby improving total execution time in the event of
a crash (CR). A program can also go back in time by coupling an AMS to its address
space, which can be useful for creating snapshots. In addition, the notion of AMS
allows a process to extend its address space without using the expensive fork syscall,
which creates an additional heavyweight process with a completely separate address
space in the traditional process abstraction.

4.3.2 Inter-process Isolation
We defne a PetaMem process (PM process) to be a special process that can couple
an AMS with its process address space. Each PM process owns a persistent unique
identifer in the system. Before a PM process can couple an AMS with its address
space, the AMS secure switch gate checks whether the requesting PM process has
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the privilege to access data in the AMS. The creator of an AMS can namely grant
other PM processes the privilege to couple the AMS with other address spaces. Each
AMS maintains a list of privileged PM processes that are allowed to be coupled with
the AMS. With the AMS secure switch gate, PetaMem can prevent unprivileged PM
processes from coupling a privileged AMS with their address spaces (MI).

4.3.3 Intra-process Isolation
PetaMem defnes a private domain to be a contiguous range of memory addresses
within an AMS. To access memory in a private domain, threads must be granted
privileges:
{Read | Write | Execute | Allocate → (Domain, AMS )}
The programmer can dynamically manage private domains to selectively isolate an
AMS so that only privileged threads can access private domains.
We defne a PM thread container to be a special sandbox with a collection of
domains in an AMS. Threads running in a PM thread container must be explicitly
granted permission to access data in private domains. A PM thread container enables programmers to construct software component boundaries within an AMS. For
example, two PM thread containers can have di˙erent privileges to access the same
private domain without having to use di˙erent processes to isolate access privileges
(e.g., concurrent readers and exclusive writers). Traditional threads (i.e., share all)
and processes (i.e., share none, unless with expensive synchronization) do not allow
such fexible and secure sharing.
We defne a PetaMem thread (PMthread) to be a special thread that strictly
follows the privileges defned by an assigned PM thread container to access private
domains in an AMS. Before a PMthread can access private domains in an AMS, the
programmer must grant privilege to the PM thread container that the PMthread
is assigned to. PMthreads share process-wide code and data with other PMthreads
and regular threads (e.g., pthreads). PetaMem also allows PMthreads to share data
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PetaMem API

Description

int petamem_main_init(void)

Initialize PetaMem environment and enter the main AMS.

int petamem_main_fnalize(void)

Finalize PetaMem environment and clean up the main AMS.

int petamem_create(void)

Create an AMS and return a system-wide unique ID assigned by
the kernel.

int petamem_kill(AMS_ID)

Kill the AMS and clean up related metadata.

int petamem_get_id(void)

Return the current AMS_ID that the caller currently couples with.

int petamem_switch_ams(src, dst)

Switch from one AMS to another. The caller can use memory in
destination AMS after the function returns.

void* petamem_malloc(name, AMS_ID, size)

Allocate a memory chunk in AMS_ID and record the allocation in

int petamem_free(name, *ptr)

Free the memory chunk and delete the allocation from log.

log.

Figure 4.2.: PetaMem AMS management API.

in a private domain, which forms a partially shared AMS with a fexible yet secure
sharing mechanism (MI). Each PMthread has its own private stack inaccessible to other
PMthreads. Such stack isolation is especially desirable for security critical applications

that are vulnerable to control-fow hijacking attacks [112].

4.3.4 PetaMem API
We implemented the PetaMem API to allow programmers to interact with AMSes (UPI). Figure 4.2 summarizes the core API. A PM process can create, couple
with, decouple from, and delete AMSes. When a process initializes itself as a PM process, PetaMem reserves a contiguous range of virtual memory in the process address
space for AMSes. Only the creator of an AMS can modify the privileges of the AMS
or delete the AMS from the system. Programmers can confgure private domains to
achieve selective memory isolation (i.e., controlled sharing) for PMthreads.
Figure 4.3 gives an example of the PetaMem API usage in a program: The process
initializes the PetaMem environment and creates two additional AMSes. After switching into AMS 1, the process allocates an integer variable num and assigns it a value 1.
Then the process switches into AMS 2 and writes a value 2 to the “same” variable.
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1

unsigned l o n g TB_SIZE=1UL< <40; / / 1TB

2

v o i d main ( ) {

3

...

4

//

5

ams_id [ 0 ] = petamem_main_init ( ) ;

6

/ / Create a d d i t i o n a l two AMSs

7

ams_id [ 1 ] = petamem_create ( ) ;

8

ams_id [ 2 ] = petamem_create ( ) ;

9
10

I n i t i a l i z e and couple w i t h AMS 0

/ / Switch from AMS 0 t o AMS 1
petamem_switch_ams ( ams_id [ 0 ] , ams_id [ 1 ] ) ;

11

/ / A l l o c a t e memory i n AMS 1

12

num = ( i n t * ) petamem_malloc ( " t a b l e " , TB_SIZE ) ;

13

/ / Set v a r i a b l e num t o 1 i n AMS 1

14

num [ 0 ] = 1 ;

15

/ / Switch from main AMS 1 t o AMS 2

16

petamem_switch_ams ( ams_id [ 1 ] , ams_id [ 2 ] ) ;

17

/ / A l l o c a t e memory i n AMS 2

18

num = ( i n t * ) petamem_malloc ( " t a b l e " , TB_SIZE ) ;

19

/ / Set v a r i a b l e num t o 2 i n AMS 2

20

num [ 0 ] = 2 ;

21

/ / I n AMS 2 now , o u t p u t : num [ 0 ] = 2

22

o u t p u t (num [ 0 ] ) ;

23

/ / Switch back t o AMS 1

24

petamem_switch_ams ( ams_id [ 2 ] , ams_id [ 1 ] ) ;

25

/ / I n AMS 1 now , o u t p u t : num [ 0 ] = 1

26

o u t p u t (num [ 0 ] ) ;

27

/ / Switch back t o AMS 0

28

petamem_switch_ams ( ams_id [ 1 ] , ams_id [ 0 ] ) ;

29

/ / I n AMS 0 now , num i s u n i n i t i a l i z e d

30

o u t p u t (num) ;

31

...

32

/ / Resource cleanup

33

petamem_main_finalize ( ) ;

34

}

Figure 4.3.: Example of PetaMem API usage. The PetaMem API associates a variable
name and a AMS upon allocation in a system-wide allocation log to distinguish
memory pages.
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Figure 4.4.: Example of PMthreads isolation in an AMS.

Since the process is coupled with AMS 2, outputting the variable num shows 2. When
the process switches back to AMS 1, the value stored in num becomes 1. Finally the
process cleans up the system resources by calling petamem_main_fnalize. Note that
the runtime and kernel can distinguish between num in AMS 1 and AMS 2. Such
ability to decouple memory from a process provides programmers with a powerful
mechanism to pass workloads stored in an AMS between processes (e.g., incremental
computation, pipelined operation) as well as a fast way to resume execution (e.g.,
crash recovery).
To isolate memory within an AMS, PetaMem does not require programmers to
create a completely separate address space [7]. Figure 4.4 gives an example of how
programmers can structure an AMS with di˙erent privileges for PMthreads by using
the domain_* functions listed in Figure 4.5. Programmers can store program secrets
in a private domain and allow only privileged threads to access memory within the
domain. In addition to enforcing a security boundary, such compartmentalization
also allows programmers to identify faulty threads that issue unintended memory
references across user-defned memory boundaries.

4.4 Recovery Engine
In this section we describe PetaMem’s crash recovery engine by which applications
resume execution after crashes.
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PetaMem API

Description

int petamem_grant

Grant the executable with path *exe_path the permission to cou-

(AMS_ID, *exe_path)

ple AMS_ID with its address space.
Create a PMthread container and return the container ID assigned

int container_create(void)

by the kernel.
int container_kill(CONTAINER_ID)
int PMthread_create

Delete a container and release its resources.
Create a PMthread confned to a container and start execution

(CONTAINER_ID, *fn, *args)

from function fn with argument *args.
Create a private domain in the current AMS and returned the

int domain_create(void)

kernel assigned ID.
int domain_kill(DOMAIN_ID)

Kill a private domain from the current AMS.

void* domain_malloc(name, DOMAIN_ID, size)

Allocate a private memory chunk in DOMAIN_ID and record the
allocation in log.
Free the private memory chunk and delete the allocation from

int domain_free(name, *ptr)

log.
int domain_privs_mod
(DOMAIN_ID, CONTAINER_ID, privs)

Grant a container to access memory in a domain with privileges
specifed by privs.

Figure 4.5.: PetaMem isolation API.

4.4.1 Persistent Memory Views
PetaMem enables applications to perceive memory segments as persistent regions
that can survive between process restarts, and even between machine power cycles
when using NVM as main memory (CR). Data stored in an AMS does not have to be
associated with the life cycle of any processes in the system. Such notion of persistence is equivalent to storing data on fle systems for durability, but with the beneft
of eliminating the expensive swapping operations (EF). It is achieved by recording
a variable as a named data area with an AMS identifer upon an allocation, thus
presenting an AMS as a persistent memory view. With petamem_malloc, PetaMem
allocates persistent memory in a global domain of the current AMS. When isolation is
needed, applications can use domain_malloc to allocate memory in a private domain
of the current AMS.
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4.4.2 Fault Model
PetaMem allows programmers to commit a persistent memory view by fushing
data in an AMS from volatile caches to NVM explicitly. Flushing caches ensures that
the data stored in volatile caches reaches memory without losing the data that has
not yet arrived at main memory in the event of a crash [56, 61]. Once the data in
caches reaches main memory, PetaMem marks the region as recoverable and NVM is
able to persist the data even without power. The numbers we report in Section 4.6.4
include the overheads of fushing caches.
The crash recovery engine of PetaMem relies on applications to commit persistent
memory views at consistent program points for correct crash recovery. Committing
a persistent memory view at an inconsistent program point, i.e., inside a critical
section, could result in an inconsistent program state as PetaMem does not maintain
a undo or redo log to roll back execution. Programmers should checkpoint persistent
memory views outside of any synchronization code sections and maintain application
specifc metadata (e.g., counters for tracking execution progress) in order to recover
from failures. To enable recovery from failures in the middle of a critical section,
programmers need to create and commit a consistent version of the shared data
before entering a critical section. In the event of a failure, PetaMem guarantees that
data stored in a persistent memory view will be accessible through variable name and
AMS_ID after the completion of the recovery procedure. Programmers can then use

application specifc metadata (e.g., variable names, progress counters, or consistent
state identifers) to restore the data in a persistent memory view back to a consistent
state. Note that restoring execution state automatically for NVM applications is an
orthogonal topic that is covered by techniques that inter failure atomic sections using
locks [56, 61]. Such user-space techniques can be run on top of PetaMem to simplify
code refactoring e˙orts for programmers.
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1

v o i d main ( ) {

2

...

3

/ / Recovery code

4

i f ( petamem_crashed ( ) ) {

5

petamem_recover(& ams_id_array ) ;

6

petamem_recover_var ( " t a b l e " , ams_id , s i z e ,& t a b l e ) ;

7

}

8

/ / Normal e x e c u t i o n

9

else

10

{

t a b l e = ( i n t * ) petamem_malloc ( " t a b l e " , s i z e ) ;

11

}

12

update_loop ( t a b l e , s i z e ) ;

13

...

14

}

Figure 4.6.: Pseudo-code for crash recovery using PetaMem.

4.4.3 Recovery Code
PetaMem provides a simple interface summarized in Figure 4.7 for applications to
recover from crash failures (UPI). Programmers can use petamem_crashed to examine
the crash status of the calling process. In the event of a crash, programs initiate the
recovery routine that consists of two parts. First, programmers invoke the application
agnostic functions petamem_recover and petamem_recover_var (Figure 4.6) to notify
the PetaMem recovery engine to recover the PetaMem metadata and the requested
variable in a target AMS, which exists in the system despite process failures. The
PetaMem crash recovery engine maintains a system-wide crash record that contains
all allocated variables in all persistent memory views. Programmers need to specify
the variable name and AMS_ID to locate the variable in the specifed AMS_ID for
recovery. After petamem_recover_var returns, programmers can access the recovered
variable in memory. Second, the crashed application may need to execute application
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PetaMem API

Description

bool petamem_crashed(void)

Check whether the process has crashed in the previous run.

int petamem_recover(*ams_id_array)

Recover all AMSes from previous run and couple with the last
AMS before a crash.

int petamem_recover_var
(name, AMS_ID, size, **ptr)

Recover a variable name allocated in AMS_ID and set *ptr to the
recovered memory. Caller must be coupled with AMS_ID before
the variable can be recovered.

int petamem_persist(void)

Flush caches to persist data pages for the current AMS.

Figure 4.7.: PetaMem recovery API.

specifc code to resume operation. The requirement for applications to construct an
application specifc recovery logic for crash tolerance is similar to other systems [61,
63].
Figure 4.6 gives an example of a crash fault-tolerant application with PetaMem.
In normal execution, the application allocates table in an AMS (line 11) and should
execute the update loop (line 13) until reaching the end of the execution. If a crash
happens in the middle of the update loop, restarting the application will trigger the
recovery procedure (line 4 to 8). The crash recovery engine will locate the AMS in the
system and recover table to enable the application to resume execution for a faster
update loop. While the simple example requires only one line to recover an array for
the update loop, the complexity of an application decides the amount of code required
for recovery.

4.5 Implementation
In this section we describe the implementation details of our PetaMem prototype.
We implemented PetaMem for Linux kernel version 4.4 on the x86-64 architecture.
Table 4.1 summarizes the components of our PetaMem prototype.
Figure 4.8 shows the high-level architecture of PetaMem. We implemented the
PetaMem design with two main components: a user space programming interface with

93
Component

LoC

Files

Level

PetaMem API

1281

8

user, untrusted

Recovery engine

480

2

user, untrusted

Communication channel

553

2

kernel

PetaMem Kernel

3035

65

kernel

Table 4.1.: PetaMem component sizes.

PetaMem architecture
User space
PetaMem process
PetaMem
thread container #1

PetaMem
thread container #2

Recovery engine

…

PetaMem API

PetaMem
thread container #N
System libraries

PetaMem channel

OS kernel

Memory management unit
PetaMem metadata manager

PetaMem memory pager

AMS secure switch gate

Intra-process isolation engine

Page fault handler
PetaMem reference monitor

AMS

Memory pool

AMS
X

Figure 4.8.: PetaMem Architecture.

a crash recovery engine and a kernel space memory management unit. The user space
programming interface provides programmers with an API to manage the memory
space of an application (UPI). The crash recovery engine tracks the execution status
of PM processes in the system and provides useful information to help a crashed PM
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process resume execution from its last checkpoint (CR). For exchanging messages
between the PetaMem API in user space and the kernel, we added the PetaMem
channel that sanitizes inputs before handing over messages to the kernel.
The extended kernel implements the core functionalities of PetaMem. The metadata manager oversees all PetaMem-related activity. The PetaMem pager switches
in and out memory pages of an AMS (LMS). To manage inter-process isolation, we
added the AMS secure switch gate to manage system-wide privilege information and
ensure that only the PM processes with the correct privilege can access memory in
an AMS. To isolate PMthreads, we added an intra-process isolation engine to manage
the isolation setup for every AMS in the system. We modifed the page fault handler
in the kernel to enforce privilege separation and block any underprivileged memory
references issued by PMthreads (MI). PetaMem can be deployed to OS kernels that
use page tables for virtual address translation without any HW modifcations (PI).

4.5.1 PetaMem Channel
We developed a PetaMem kernel module that allows the user-space PetaMem API
to exchange messages with the kernel through a well-defned Netlink socket interface
in Linux. All the messages from the user-space PetaMem API are sanitized by the
PetaMem channel. The kernel interprets the sanitized messages and calls the related
kernel functions to complete the requests of the PetaMem API.

4.5.2 PetaMem Metadata Management
The PetaMem metadata management unit in the kernel eÿciently manages the
state of all AMSes in the system.

For each AMS in the system, we added an

ams_struct to describe its private domains, PM containers, PMthreads, and privilege

information. Within an ams_struct, we added two major kernel objects to manage
the private domains of an AMS. (1) domain_struct: private domain metadata for
tracking private domains in an AMS. (2) container_struct: privilege information for
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accessing private domains in an AMS. To eÿciently decide whether a virtual address
is protected by a private domain, we added vm_range objects to store the virtual
address range for all private domains. All vm_range objects are maintained by a
red-black tree with a temporal cache, which allows the kernel to retrieve the privilege
information when a page fault happens in O(logN ) time, where N is the number of
private domains. We discuss the privilege check logic in Section 4.5.6

4.5.3 Enabling Multiple AMSes
When a process creates an AMS, PetaMem allocates a new memory mapping
vm_area_struct in the kernel to represent the region with a special VM_PETAMEM

fag. This special fag prevents the AMS mapping from being merged with neighbor
mappings or split into separate mappings. Recall that most CPUs follow the 48-bit
canonical address design, which forbids a process to address more than 48 bits of
memory. Therefore, we design PetaMem to commit 64TB (46 bits) memory in a
single user-kernel round trip. PetaMem chooses to use 46 bits for a typical AMS
size to allow for other memory regions such as text, global data, heaps, stacks, and
page guards, to co-exist in a process address space. Using multiple AMSes enables
a process to unlock the potential for accessing more memory than 48 bits (LMS).
PetaMem uses demand paging and pages in data upon page faults. Therefore, the
creation time of an AMS does not increase with the size of the AMS. This design
e˙ectively removes the scalability issue when accessing large memory.
We developed a novel mechanism to switch the address space of a process from
one AMS to another eÿciently. PetaMem manipulates the page tables covering an
AMS mapping. A straightforward approach is to manipulate every level of page
tables when switching address spaces. However, this approach would greatly impact
the performance and scalability of a program due to the expensive and frequent page
walks. To overcome this well-known problem when modifying page tables, PetaMem
swaps only top-level page global directory entries (pgd_t) that cover an AMS mapping.
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Figure 4.9.: AMS memory management.

We illustrate the design in Figure 4.9: The process reads a variable x that refers two
di˙erent values in two separate AMSes. When coupled with AMS 1, reading the
variable x returns 0 because PetaMem retrieves data page A associated with AMS 1.
After switching into AMS 2, PetaMem retrieves data page B with 2 stored in the
variable x by performing a page walk from a pgd_t that belongs to AMS 2.
On a 64-bit architecture, a pgd_t points to 1TB of memory. Therefore, switching
62TB of memory only requires PetaMem to load 124 pgd_ts. The cost of this operation is negligible compared to the naïve approach. PetaMem employs the PetaMem
metadata manager to systematically manage the mapping between a set of pgd_ts
and an AMS so that an application can correctly roam between AMSes. To prevent
unintended access, PetaMem aligns the start and end address of an AMS to page
boundaries and inserts a random amount of guard pages on both ends that randomizes the start and end address of the AMS.
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4.5.4 PM Process and PMthreads Memory Management
When a PM process couples an AMS with its address space, our kernel assigns the
AMS’s ams_struct the PM process’s memory descriptor mm_struct so that other MMU
components in the kernel can easily access the ams_struct of an AMS. Our kernel
records the pdg_t entries of an AMS in the AMS’s ams_struct. Unlike a traditional
process, the memory space described by an ams_struct can be completely decoupled
from a PM process’s memory. Therefore, a PM process can couple with di˙erent
AMSes freely, allowing the memory space in an AMS to stay alive in the system
beyond the lifetime of any PM process. To separate privileges for PMthreads, each
container in an AMS uses one page table root (pgd frame) to describe the isolated
memory space. During context switch, our kernel ensures that an isolated PMthread
must use its assigned container’s page table to access memory to prevent privilege
escalation.

4.5.5 Private Memory Allocation
Instead of granting all PMthreads the same permission to access memory in an
AMS, PetaMem allows applications to structure AMS into several di˙erent private
domains. The PetaMem memory allocator internally uses the region-based memory allocator dlmalloc [113] to manage memory in private domains. By specifying
a base address and region size, a region-based memory allocator can allocate memory within the specifed range. The PetaMem API registers a memory region within
an AMS mapping in the kernel for each private domain. Each AMS has a number of new kernel objects vm_range to record the range and permission of private
domains. With vm_range, PetaMem does not need to tag individual memory allocations. PetaMem can lookup the access permission to an address by accessing
the corresponding vm_range object. The PetaMem API guarantees that all memory
allocations in private domains must happen in the registered memory region. We
describe how PetaMem detects memory references across domains next.
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Figure 4.10.: PetaMem pager privilege checks for intra-process isolation. The additional privilege checks are marked in the shaded area.

4.5.6 Enforcing Memory Isolation
Our prototype supports both inter-process isolation for PM processes and intraprocess isolation for PMthreads. Since it is possible for a PM process to access an AMS
that is created by another PM process in the system by natively switching memory
mappings, the AMS secure switch gate needs to enforce that a PM process without
privileges cannot couple with a privileged AMS. PetaMem maintains system-wide
metadata for each AMSes to describe the privilege mapping between PM processes
and AMSes. Each AMS has a petamem_struct in the kernel that records the creator
and a list of PM processes allowed to couple with it. Before the PetaMem memory
pager swaps in a requested AMS for a PM process, that process must pass the privilege
checks performed by the AMS secure switch gate in the kernel. Once a PM process
couples an AMS with its address space, PetaMem provides another level of privilege
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separation within the AMS. Figure 4.10 shows how the PetaMem pager intercepts
invalid memory references by performing additional privilege checks for PMthreads in
the page fault handler. The red-black tree for vm_range (cf. Section 4.5.2) allows the
reference monitor of PetaMem to quickly intercept invalid memory references at page
faults.

4.5.7 Recovering from Failures
When a PM process calls petamem_main_init (cf. Figure 4.2) to initialize the
PetaMem environment, the crash recovery engine creates a crash entry in the global
crash table for the PM process using the complete path of the program binary. When
exiting the system, the PM process calls petamem_main_fnalize to request the recovery engine to remove the PM process’s entry from the crash table. If the PM
process crashes in between these two API calls, the entry will remain in the crash
table, leading the recovery engine to decide that the process has crashed in the previous execution. When recovering a crashed PM process, the crash recovery engine
coordinates with the kernel space PetaMem metadata manager to locate all metadata for the crashed AMSes. With the metadata, the PetaMem memory pager can
identify the memory pages in the crashed AMSes and switch in the pdg_ts when the
PM process re-couples with those AMSes.

4.6 Evaluation
4.6.1 Synopsis and Setup
We evaluate PetaMem to answer the following questions: (1) How eÿcient (EF)
is PetaMem when accessing di˙erent address spaces (LMS) compared to traditional
multi-processing or memory management syscalls (UPI)? (2) Can PetaMem intercept
unprivileged memory references to ensure memory isolation (MI)? (3) How signifcant
is fast recovery (CR)?

4000

100000
10000
1000
100
10
1
0.1
384

192

96

48

Size of arrays in STREAM (GB)
mmap (tmpfs-backed) PetaMem

24

128

64

32

16

8

4

2

0

12

1000

6

2000

3

Delays (ms)

3000

1

Wall clock time (sec)

100

Size of switched memory (GB)
mmap (tmpfs-backed) PetaMem

Figure 4.11.: STREAM performance.

Figure 4.12.: Memory switch delays.
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We ran experiments on a machine with an Intel Xeon E5-4655 (64 cores@2.5GHz)
and 512GB RAM to study PetaMem’s ability to access large memory. Our prototype
successfully passed all stress tests in LTP’s [48] runltp script that systematically tests
major kernel subsystems.

4.6.2 Performance: Sequential Access
We use the STREAM benchmark [114] from the HPCC benchmark suite to study
the performance of PetaMem when accessing large datasets with strong locality.
STREAM measures the computation rate of vector style applications that access
datasets much larger than the available cache on a system. STREAM allocates three
data arrays and performs copy, add, and multiply operations in a loop. We evaluated
two versions of STREAM:
STREAMmmap , the single-threaded vanilla version of the benchmark except where
we moved the data arrays from the global region to heap for large memory allocations.
STREAMPetaMem leverages PetaMem to store datasets in AMSes and eÿciently
switches between the AMSes.
To study large memory, we choose an array size from 1GB to 128GB for each array.
We partitioned each array into multiple 1GB sub-arrays. Both versions of STREAM
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load the sub-arrays one after another and perform updates until all sub-arrays are updated. The data access pattern has strong locality that favors mmap as the memory
switching frequency is minimal (i.e., at most 128 times). However, although mmap
notably performs well when few to no changes in memory mappings are involved,
Figure 4.11 shows that STREAMPetaMem is still 1.3× faster than STREAMmmap because STREAMmmap is three orders of magnitude slower than STREAMPetaMem when
switching memory mappings (Figure 4.12). Such limitation could greatly impact the
performance of applications that have random access patterns, which we discuss next.

4.6.3 Performance: Random Access
We use the GUPS benchmark [99] that is specifcally designed for profling the
memory architecture of a system to demonstrate the performance, scalability, isolation ability, and recoverability of PetaMem. GUPS allocates a large logical table in
memory and randomly updates the elements in the table. The large table is divided
into a number of windows. Within each window, GUPS performs a set of updates at
random locations. Each update is a read-modify-write operation on a long unsigned
integer. After GUPS fnishes a set of updates in one window, it randomly chooses
the next window to mutate the elements and repeat the procedure. Originally GUPS
requires the maximum table size to be no larger than half the system memory. The
memory distribution of the logical table can be implemented in various ways. We
evaluate the performance of GUPS using three di˙erent memory models:
GUPSMPI is the vanilla version of the benchmark that uses multiple processes to
parallelize the update operations using the OpenMPI framework. All processes are
connected in an N -dimensional hypercube. Each process holds a distinct window in
its process address space and performs updates to its local table. Each process communicates with its neighbors to coordinate the execution progress before processing
the next update set.
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GUPSmmap uses the traditional mmap/munmap syscalls to logically extend its process address space. For each window, GUPSmmap calls mmap to read a portion of
the global table, then performs updates. To mutate elements in the next window,
GUPSmmap needs to call munmap for the current window and calls mmap again to
load another window into its process address space.
GUPSPetaMem leverages PetaMem using a single process to eÿciently switch between
di˙erent windows without modifying the memory mappings and their underlying
PTEs. Each window is represented as an AMS in the system, enabling GUPSPetaMem
to dynamically couple with and decouple from a window for fast updates.
We used GUPSMPI from the HPCC benchmark suite and implemented GUPSmmap
and GUPSPetaMem . Figure 4.13 shows the GUPS performance, averaged over 10 runs,
for the three memory models. The size of the global table ranges from 1GB to 256GB
(half the system memory). We set the window size to 1GB to evaluate the cost of
using multiple address spaces (up to 256) and report millions of updates per process
on the y-axis. Following the oÿcial GUPS benchmark, the runtime measurement for
all three memory models only considers the execution time of the update loop without
initialization and cleanup.
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When using one address space, GUPSMPI and GUPSPetaMem perform equally well
since no address space switches were needed. However, GUPSMPI becomes extremely
expensive when using more than two processes (EF). The performance bottleneck
denotes the classic scalability limitation of multi-processing caused by heavy resource
usage and expensive synchronization cost. Therefore, such multi-processing is less
favorable for memory-hungry applications that require multiple address spaces. Our
experiment shows that mmap/munmap is ineÿcient for logically extending process
memory. In the update loop, GUPSmmap has to call mmap to create a mapping
for every window. Such frequent memory manipulation in the kernel space makes
GUPSmmap scale poorly (or not at all) compared to GUPSMPI and GUPSPetaMem in
all cases. Increasing the number of address spaces only exacerbates the bottleneck of
GUPSmmap (EF).
Discussion. Since TLB misses can lead to measurable performance degradation,
we study the TLB misses of GUPSMPI , GUPSmmap , and GUPSPetaMem to unveil the
impact caused by translation misses and present the results in Figure 4.14. When
using a single window, GUPSmmap incurs most TLB misses because GUPSmmap needs to
mmap the window to its address space in the update routine, even when there’s only a

single window. GUPSMPI exhibits the second most TLB misses due to the additional
memory access to set up the multi-processing environment. Both GUPSMPI and
GUPSPetaMem initialize the global table before entering the update loop. GUPSPetaMem
has the smallest number of TLB misses because PetaMem does not invoke any MPI
calls to use multi-processing.
As the number of address spaces increases, the number of TLB misses grows for
all three memory models of GUPS. However, once the number of address spaces exceeds the number of cores, GUPSMPI starts to thrash the memory hierarchy, causing
GUPSMPI to exhibit most TLB misses among all three memory models when using
more than 64 address spaces. For GUPSmmap , the heavy use of mmap and munmap causes the kernel to constantly change the process’s mapping between physical

and virtual memory. As a result, the number of TLB misses of GUPSmmap increases
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with the number of address spaces. When more windows are used, the number of
TLB misses of GUPSPetaMem slightly increases due to higher degree of random memory access. Since PetaMem fushes only the TLB entries in AMSes when switching
memory spaces, GUPSPetaMem does not pollute the caches like GUPSmmap when manipulating mappings, nor does it incur global TLB fushing like GUPSMPI . Therefore,
GUPSPetaMem outperforms the other two memory models.

4.6.4 Application Recovery Speedup
To evaluate the benefts of providing recovery support to programs, we repeated
the experiment in Section 4.6.3 and introduced crash points using a machine with
an Intel i7-4790 (8 cores@2.8GHz) and 16GB RAM, showing that PetaMem does not
rely on large memory to run correctly (PI). We crashed each of GUPSMPI , GUPSmmap ,
and GUPSPetaMem when they reached 25%, 50%, 75%, and 95% of the total execution progress by calling abort to simulate the abnormal termination of a process. All
three versions of GUPS then had to restart and complete the execution. We made
GUPSmmap able to recover from crash failures by periodically checkpointing the execution state using FS calls. Note that GUPSmmap uses tmpfs for memory-like access
speed so the kernel does not incur storage device overheads. GUPSMPI has to restart
from the beginning and redo all the computation again as the OpenMPI framework
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does not yet provide an easy way to completely recover the global execution state
across all processes. The recovery engine of PetaMem tracks the execution state of
GUPSPetaMem and allows the system to locate the metadata and page tables from the
previous run, enabling GUPSPetaMem to couple with the last window from the previous
run and continue execution from the last checkpoint (CR).
We plot the speedup over GUPSmmap for crash recovery in Figure 4.15. The xaxis shows the percentage of completed progress when a crash happens in major
ticks and the number of address spaces in minor ticks. We normalize the execution
times to GUPSmmap , which is the slowest memory model in all three versions of the
GUPS benchmark. When using a single window, GUPSMPI outperforms GUPSPetaMem
because the recovery engine introduces additional CPU cycles to set up and maintain
the execution state. With two or four windows, GUPSPetaMem is slightly faster than
GUPSMPI because the additional cycles spent by the recovery engine pay o˙ and
help GUPSPetaMem continue execution from the last checkpoint. Once the number
of windows exceeds the number of cores on the system, GUPSMPI slows down to
almost the speed of GUPSmmap , which refects the fnding we showed in Figure 4.13.
GUPSPetaMem outperforms GUPSMPI signifcantly when using more than 8 windows.
With the help from the crash recovery engine in PetaMem, we only need less than
20 lines of code to make GUPSPetaMem tolerate crash failures (UPI). We allocate the
progress counters and the global table in an AMS using petamem_malloc, which automatically tracks the address, name, and size of the variable in a memory allocation
log. Before a normal execution, GUPSPetaMem checks if the program has crashed in
the previous execution by calling petamem_crashed, and invokes petamem_recover
and petamem_recover_var to retrieve all PetaMem metadata and bindings to persistent variables (cf. Figure 4.6), enabling GUPSPetaMem to correctly couple with the last
window and resume execution.
GUPSPetaMem uses petamem_checkpoint to explicitly checkpoint the execution
progress and notifes the kernel to fush the CPU caches to main memory after fnishing every update set. After the API call returns, the PetaMem metadata and
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the page tables are persisted in main memory. Since the kernel does not clean up
PetaMem resources until explicitly instructed to, GUPSPetaMem can resume execution
by reusing the metadata and memory pages from the last checkpoint. In the event
of power failure, using NVM as main memory will allow GUPSPetaMem to resume execution without restarting from scratch. The experiment shows the potential for fast
failure recovery.

4.6.5 Enforcement of Isolation
In PetaMem, the AMS secure switch gate vets every AMS coupling request issued
by a PM process and every page fault triggers the privilege checks as depicted in Figure 2.5. Since we ran all the experiments with privilege enforcement, the performance
numbers reported herein already include the overheads of additional privilege checks.
Using the PetaMem API introduced in Figure 4.2, we implemented a security
policy allowing only GUPSPetaMem to couple with the AMSes that store the partitioned
tables of GUPSPetaMem . No other processes should be able to couple with those
AMSes. To test the AMS secure switch gate in PetaMem, we launched a separate
PM process as a cross-process attacker that attempted to couple with those AMSes.
With the GUPSPetaMem not specifying any privileges for other PM processes to access
its AMSes (i.e., distrusting other PM processes by default), the AMS secure switch
gate successfully blocked all unprivileged coupling requests issued by the attacker PM
process (MI).
To verify the enforcement of user-defned memory boundaries for PMthreads with
the intra-process isolation engine in PetaMem, we conducted an experiment similar to
GUPSPetaMem by creating a privileged domain in a special AMS. We randomly chose an
AMS as the special AMS and allocated a privileged domain within the special AMS,
then put a partition of the global table into the privileged domain. In our experiment,
we implemented a security policy that disallows the PMthread of GUPSPetaMem to
access the privileged domain by isolating the PMthread in a PM container. Note
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that the PMthread can couple with the special AMS without triggering exceptions.
However, when the PMthread of GUPSPetaMem attempted to access the partition of the
table stored in the privileged domain, the reference monitor in PetaMem successfully
blocked the paging request issued by the unprivileged PMthread (MI).

4.7 Conclusion
We have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of PetaMem, a
fast and scalable memory architecture. PetaMem promotes the simple abstraction
of an autonomous memory space (AMS), which strives for controlled (de)coupling
in space and robust (de)coupling in time of processes and memory spaces. This enables applications to access memory beyond process (LMS) boundaries with strong
isolation (MI) and crash recovery support (CR). Our evaluation shows that PetaMem
allows applications to access multiple address spaces with simple memory instructions (UPI) eÿciently. Compared to the traditional process-centric architecture, its
crash failure recovery engine in PetaMem enables applications to resume execution
after crash failures with drastic speedup (EF) over traditional memory management
and fle system interface calls. The isolation engine in PetaMem helps applications
isolate software components in large memory pools with user-defned boundaries (PI).
The privilege enforcement is implemented using existing HW protection mechanisms,
providing strong guarantees. In summary, until HW solutions catch up with the
rapid growth in data size and memory capacity, PetaMem constitutes a practical
pure software-based solution for memory-driven computing. In the future we plan to
investigate support for other failure/threat models.
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5 CONCLUSION
This dissertation has advanced the design and implementation of existing memory subsystems to enhance the security, consistency, and scalability of applications
through a software approach. We presented three practical memory subsystems;
SMVs, a comprehensive framework for concurrent threads to achieve selective memory isolation, NVthreads, a user-space library for programmers to easily leverage nonvolatile memory, and PetaMem, a novel architecture for data-intensive applications
to freely access large amount of memory with isolation and crash recovery support.
We showed that SMVs can improve the security of multithreaded applications
by protecting software components from poor memory isolation in today’s process
memory model. With SMVs, programmers can now structure the intrinsically shared
process memory into a dynamic set of memory protection domains using the welldefned API. The kernel-level privilege enforcement in SMVs provides fast and accurate privilege checks without impacting the performance of software. We evaluated
our solution through multithreaded benchmarks with complex memory interaction
and demonstrated its practicability by porting popular web servers and Firefox web
browser for security.
To ensure the consist states for multithreaded applications running on non-volatile
memory systems, our solution, NVthreads, leverages synchronization operations to
determine consistency semantics and coarse-grained page-level tracking to manage
persistent data. Our extensive evaluation showed that NVthreads signifcantly reduces the performance gap between unmodifed applications and their crash tolerant
counterparts. With NVthreads, programmers can now easily transition to the nonvolatile memory era.
For scalability, our memory subsystem PetaMem provides controlled space and
time (de)coupling to enable data-intensive applications to access large amount of
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memory with simple memory operations. PetaMem exposes an API which enables
programmers to freely access memory in di˙erent address spaces eÿciently. PetaMem
puts together the security benefts of SMVs and the recoverability support from
NVthreads for memory-centric computing, making large memory pool more reliable
and practical. The evaluation showed that PetaMem signifcantly outperforms the
traditional process-centric architecture.
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